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To me belongeth vengeance, and recompence; their foot shall slide in
due time: for the day of their calamity is at hand, and the things that
shall come upon them shall make haste.'
That which cometh out of the man, that defileth the man. For from
within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries,
fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit,
lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness: all these
things come from within, and defile the man.2
[A] law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and
no law: and it is impossible to obey contradictions or act according to
them.'
I. INTRODUCTION.
Sexual harassment is a term that emerged in the United States in the last two
decades to describe an intractable problem which has existed for centuries.
Consider, for example, the case of Joseph and Potiphar's wife in the Old
Testament of the Bible. Joseph, the grandson of Isaac, and the great-grandson
of Abraham, was the most favoured son of Jacob.4 When Joseph's brothers saw
1. Deuteronomy 32:35 (King James).
2. Mark 7:20-23 (King James).
3. Vaughan, C.J., in Thomas v. Sorrell (1677), reprinted in George C. Christie & Patrick H.
Martin, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings on the Philosophy of Law 216 (2d ed. 1995).
4. See Genesis 37:3 (King James). By this time, God had changed Jacob's name to "Israel,"
from whom "a nation and a company of nations" and kings would arise. See Genesis 35:11 (King
James).
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that their father loved Joseph more than they, they hated and envied Joseph.'
Joseph's brothers conspired against Joseph, planning to kill him and to cast him
into a pit. Nevertheless, Joseph's brother Reuben, hoping that he might later
save Joseph, persuaded Joseph's brothers merely to cast Joseph into a pit.'
Joseph's brothers sold him to a company of Ishmeelites for twenty pieces
of silver, and the Ishmeelites brought Joseph into Egypt.7 In Egypt, Potiphar,
an officer of Pharaoh and captain of the guard, bought Joseph from the
Ishmeelites.8 "And the LORD was with Joseph,"9 and Potiphar made Joseph
overseer over Potiphar's entire house.' °
Unfortunately, however, Joseph became one of the first recorded victims of
sexual harassment at the workplace:
And it came to pass after these things, that his master's wife cast her
eyes upon Joseph; and she said, Lie with me. But he refused, and said
unto his master's wife, Behold, my master wotteth not what is with me
in the house, and he hath committed all that he hath into my hand;
There is none greater in this house than I; neither hath he kept back
anything from me but thee, because thou art his wife: how then can I
do this great wickedness, and sin against God? And it came to pass, as
she spake to Joseph day by day, that he hearkened not unto her, to lie
by her, or to be with her. And it came to pass about this time, that
Joseph went into the house to do his business; and there was none of
the men of the house there within. And she caught him by his garment,
saying Lie with me: and he left his garment in her hand, and fled, and
got him out. And it came to pass, when she saw that he had left his
garment in her hand, and was fled forth, [t]hat she called unto the men
of her house, and spake unto them, saying, See, he hath brought in an
Hebrew unto us to mock us: he came in unto lie with me, and I cried
with a loud voice; and it came to pass, when he heard that I lifted up
my voice and cried, that he left his garment with me, and fled, and got
him out. And she laid up his garment by her, until his lord came
home .... And it came to pass, when his master heard the words of
his wife ... that his wrath was kindled. And Joseph's master took him,
and put him into the prison, a place where the king's prisoners were
bound: and he was there in the prison.'
5. See Genesis 37:4, 11 (King James).
6. See Genesis 37:22-24 (King James).
7. See Genesis 37:18-28 (King James).
8. See Genesis 39:1 (King James).
9. Genesis 39:2 (King James).
10. See Genesis 39:6 (King James).
11. Genesis 39:7-20 (King James). Fortunately, "the LORD was with Joseph, and shewed him
mercy, and gave him favour in the sight of the keeper of the prison," Genesis 39:21 (King James),
and Joseph eventually was freed by Pharoah, who made Joseph "ruler over all the land of Egypt."
Genesis 42:43 (King James). Compare Joseph's experience with the comment of one author who has
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Joseph's experience aptly illustrates that both men and women in the
workplace have suffered unwanted sexual attention and offensive behaviour
based on their gender. Often victims either are prevented from raising the issue
or are reluctant to raise the issue because of embarrassment, fear of ridicule, or
fear of losing their jobs. Victims also suffer stress and anxiety that adversely
affect their physical, emotional, and spiritual health. In addition, employers
without a specific policy and procedures for combatting and preventing sexual
harassment eventually will be confronted with problems of absenteeism, poor
work performance, and the loss of valuable employees, in addition to the cost of
litigation and compensation awards to employees who have been subjected to
sexual harassment.
In the European Economic Community ("EEC"), 2 known as the European
Union ("EU")13 since the 1991-1993 Maastricth Treaty, sexual harassment in
the workplace is a serious and prevalent problem that adversely affects both
criticized the "unwelcome" requirement in American law on sexual harassment because the
justifications offered for this requirement "demonstrate a reliance on outdated stereotypes .... The
concern that women will abuse the legal system to punish others is a familiar concept in legal history.
Such an unjustifiable belief should not be allowed to skew discrimination law towards defendants."
Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome " Requirement in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1558, 1575 (1992).
12. The European Economic Community commenced with the signing of the Treaty of Rome
in 1957 ("EEC Treaty") by the six original Member States, namely France, Germany, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The EEC Treaty is a framework treaty offering as broad general
principles the general goals to be achieved, and delegating to its institutions, both the Commission
and the Council, often with the Parliament, the responsibility to fill gaps with secondary legislation.
The general goals of the Treaty are set forth in Article 2, which provides:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressive-
ly approximating the economic policies of member States, to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and
closer relations between the States belonging to it.
The EEC Treaty symbolized the movement toward international cooperation that had developed
throughout the twentieth century, the catalyst of which was the devastation inflicted on Europe after
the Second World War. With the Treaty of Accession in 1973, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
the Republic of Ireland joined the EEC, and in 1979, Greece, and in 1986, Spain and Portugal signed
acts of accession to join the Community, raising the total membership to twelve countries. Currently,
with the recent additions of Finland, Sweden, and Austria, the total membership of the EU is fifteen
countries. The original EEC Treaty was primarily an economic treaty, the purpose of which was to
create a single European market in Europe. However, the EEC Treaty was much broader in scope
than the traditional free-trading agreements found in the original General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT'), the European Free Trade Association, and the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA') and covered a wide range of matters that were not exclusively economic and
expressly included a number of purely social goals. The Single European Act further broadened the
scope of Community competence into new areas and set forth a formal framework for political
cooperation by Member States that was not found in the original EEC Treaty, leading at Maastricth
to a further and significant extension of Community goals. Josephine Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law
3-7 (3d ed. 1992).
13. This article refers both to the EEC and to the EU interchangeably.
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victims and employers. Since 1976, the EU has exhibited increasing awareness
that sexual harassment in the EU must be prevented and remedied if sex equality
legislation in the EU is to have meaning and content. These responses to the
problem of sexual harassment reflect a belief that remedies should be available
to the victim after the harm has been done and that preventative measures at the
industry level are necessary to reduce the prevalence of sexual harassment.'4
The increased attention given by the EU to the problem of sexual harassment
at work raises the issue of whether the expansion of legal liability for sexual
harassment and the attendant increased public exposure to the issue of sexual
harassment has significantly contribute to its elimination. In response thereto,
this Article provides a general overview of the definition of sexual harassment,
the prevalence of sexual harassment at the workplace, and EU law 5 on sex
discrimination and sexual harassment. The Article then examines in detail how
the EU has addressed the problem of sexual harassment at the workplace.' 6
The Article concludes that despite its inherent problems with regard to Lon
Fuller's concept of "procedural morality," the current EU Recommendation 17
on sexual harassment is the most appropriate vehicle for confronting this
complex issue and rejects the prevalent belief that a Regulation,1 a Direc-
14. For information on the status of the individual in EU law, see Steiner, supra note 12, at
279-84. In connection therewith, Steiner discusses the three different kinds of provisions in the EU
Treaties; the two main objectives of individuals seeking legal redress in the EU; fundamental human
rights as reflected in the general principles of law and the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States; and the European Convention on Human Rights, which is a binding instrument on
EU Member States and which, as an international treaty, is supreme over the acts of the institutions
of the Member States.
15. Where appropriate, this Article also refers to industrialized countries that are not in the EU.
Because this Article is based upon an earlier paper written for Professor Alain A. Levasseur's Spring
1994 European Economic Community Seminar, the research conducted for this Article is current
through April 1994. In addition, because the focus of this Article is on EU law on sexual
harassment, the Article only briefly references American law on this subject.
16. For the sake of brevity, the paper does not discuss the actions to combat sexual harassment
taken by the United Nations ("UN") and the International Labour Organization ("ILO') "to advance
the cause of social justice and, by so doing, to contribute to ensuring universal and lasting peace."
See 132 Int'l Lab. Rev. Cover (1993). For information on actions taken by the UN, see 11 ILO,
Conditions of Work Digest 1, at 41-43 (1992).
17. EU recommendations and opinions are not binding upon Member States and are not
"enforceable Community rights" within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the European Communities
Act of 1972; therefore, it would seem that they cannot be invoked by individuals, directly or
indirectly, before national courts. Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice has held that Member
States must take Community recommendations into consideration when deciding disputes, especially
where they clarify the interpretation of national provisions adopted in order to implement them or
where they are designed to supplement binding EU measures. This view is debatable since
Recommendations, as non-binding measures, can be taken into account only in order to resolve
ambiguities in domestic law. Steiner, supra note 12, at 39.
18. An EU Regulation is described in Article 189 of the EEC Treaty as being of "general
application ... binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member States." Therefore, a
Regulation takes immediate effect without the need for further implementation. Steiner, supra note
12, at 28. As to the "vertical" and "horizontal" direct effect of Regulations, see id. at 27-28.
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tive,"9 or a provision in a European Civil Code should supplant the Recommen-
dation.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT THE WORKPLACE: A
GENERAL OVERVIEW
A. The Definition of Sexual Harassment
The definition of "sexual harassment" is important because it determines
both the number of people who believe that they have experienced sexual
harassment and the kinds of behaviour that fall within the scope of the
definition.20 Although most people have a reasonably good idea of what the
term "sexual harassment" means, it appears few people understand that "[s]exual
harassment is one of the most offensive and demeaning experiences an employee
can suffer."'" Some people, therefore, have commented that they wish they
would be harassed by a particular person, without understanding the unwanted
nature of the harassment and the consequent feelings of revulsion and violation.
Author Michael Rubenstein has stated:
2
It is a common reaction of [people], when first discussing the issue, to
say words to the effect of "I wouldn't mind being sexually harassed by
[him or] her." Such a response reveals a failure to understand the
"unwanted" character of sexual harassment for [people] and the feelings
of revulsion and violation it produces. Although the analogy is not
19. According to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, a Directive is "binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities
the choice of form and methods." Steiner, supra note 12, at 29. As to the vertical and horizontal
effect of Directives, see id. at 29-33.
20. See 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 10. In this 309 page report, the ILO examines how sexual
harassment is addressed in twenty-three industrialized countries, including the EU, the United States,
Japan, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, and Australia. The report concludes that only seven
nations have specific laws prohibiting sexual harassment and that only six of these laws are
"advanced." See Christopher Reid, Australia: Understanding Sexual Harassment, The Age
(Melbourne), Dec. 23, 1992. For a background on the report, see Anita Diamant, Sexual Harassment
on Job Widespread, 24 Nation Study Says, Boston Globe, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1; Most Nations Don't
Recognize Sex Harassment, Chicago. Trib., Dec. 1, 1992, at C17.
21. Michael Rubenstein, The Dignity of Women at Work: A Report on the Problem of Sexual
Harassment in the Member States of the European Communities 19 (1988).
22. Mr. Rubenstein is editor of Industrial Relations Law Reports and co-editor of Equal
Opportunities Review, both based in the United Kingdom. Mr. Rubenstein is also author of The
Dignity of Women at Work: A Report on the Problem of Sexual Harassment in the Member States
of the European Communities (1988); Preventing and Remedying Sexual Harassment at Work: A
Resource Manual (1992); and co-author of How to Combat Sexual Harassment at Work: A Guide
to Implementing the European Commission Code of Practice (1993). Mr. Rubenstein was a
consultant to the European Commission on the Code of Practice on measures to combat sexual
harassment. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 138-252.
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precise, [people] might benefit by considering the likely effect upon
them were they to be "harassed," not by an attractive... colleague, but
by a ... superior in the work hierarchy. How would they feel if the
[person] to whom they report and who controlled their terms and
conditions and promotion prospects made appreciative comments about
their physical attributes: if, when they entered his [or her] office, he [or
she] undressed them with his [or her] eyes; if he [or she] frequently put
a caressing arm around them; if he [or she] habitually brushed up
against them; if he [or she] threatened that they would lose their job if
they didn't have sex with him [or her]? It cannot be imagined that
most [people] would regard this as acceptable behaviour at work or that
they would consider there should be no legal recourse which would
ensure that the behaviour would stop if it was persisted in after their
objections. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that [people] who
experience such conduct are harmed by it.23
Although most people might not be able to articulate a legal definition of
"sexual harassment," they usually have a reasonably accurate idea of what sexual
harassment means. Some differences may exist, however, between how men and
women interpret the term.2 Accordingly, there remains confusion about what
exactly constitutes sexual harassment. Most definitions focus on the idea of
sexual behaviour that is either physical or verbal and that is unwelcome to its
recipient. Clear cases of sexual harassment are forcible sexual aggression,
showing pornographic pictures, and bottom-pinching, but more doubtful cases are
cheek-kissing on parting or leering.25
The concept of sexual harassment is broader than conduct that is "sexual"
in nature. Sexual harassment is more of an exhibition of power than of sexual
desire. Moreover, although "harassment" suggests the reoccurrence of offensive
conduct, a single incident of prohibited conduct can constitute sexual harass-
ment.26 Broadly defined, sexual harassment is the unwanted imposition of
sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power.27 More
generally, sexual harassment is conduct of a sexual nature or with a sexual
dimension that is unwelcome to the recipient. The key element in sexual
harassment is that it is unwanted and unreciprocated."
23. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 19.
24. Id. at 12. See infra text accompanying notes 215-229.
.25. Lucy Kellaway, Getting Sex Out of the Office: Women at Work, Fin. Times, Oct. 23,1991,
§1, at 13.
26. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 10.
27. Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working Women 1 (1979).
28. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 12.
1093
1094 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
Usually, sexual harassment falls into broad categories of verbal,29 physi-
cal3" or sex-based conduct.3 Additional forms of sexual harassment may be
visual, including displays of pornographic pictures at the workplace, pin-ups, and
other sexually suggestive or derogatory objects, pictures, or written materials.32Sexual harassment also may be classified into quid pro quo harassment,
otherwise known as sexual blackmail,33 and hostile environment harassment.34
Sexual harassment such as sexual blackmail or physical molestation may be
compared with rape and other violent sexual crimes in that, contrary to popular
belief, it is not a person's physical attractiveness that determines whether he or
she will be subjected to sexual harassment. Rather, it is vulnerable people who
are most likely to be victims of sexual harassment because from the perpetrator's
perspective, it generally is not whether the behaviour is likely to be welcomed
29. Verbal conduct of a sexual nature may include propositions and other requests or demands
for sexual favors or pressure for sexual activity; offensive flirtation; suggestive remarks, innuendoes
or lewd comments; derogatory or degrading abuse; offensive comments about appearance or dress;
epithets or slurs; and ridicule, tricks or jokes of a sexual nature. This behaviour emphasizes a view
of the recipient as being an object. Id. at 12-13.
30. Physical conduct of a sexual nature generally includes staring or leering; gestures;
unnecessary touching, patting, pinching, or brushing against another employee's body; and more
serious offences that would amount to a criminal offence if the conduct occurred between strangers.
Id. at 13.
31. Sex-based conduct may include behaviour which "[d]enigrates or ridicules or is intimidatory
or physically abusive of an employee because of his or her sex, such as derogatory or degrading
abuse or insults which are gender-related and offensive comments about appearance or dress. Such
conduct can create an offensive working environment for the recipient." Michael Rubenstein & Ineke
M. De Vries, How to Combat Sexual Harassment at Work: A Guide to Implementing the European
Commission Code of Practice 22 (1993).
32. Id. The Northern Ireland Equal Opportunities Commission has adopted a definition of
sexual harassment which includes visual harassment of this nature. Id.
33. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1993). By definition, sexual blackmail involves an abuse
of authority because only someone in the capacity of supervisor or manager has the authority to
threaten or to make an employment decision affecting the victim of harassment. Rubenstein & De
Vries,. supra note 31, at 23. Generally, quid pro quo harassment involves a grant or denial of
economic benefits following the employee's response to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favours, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. The complainant alleging quid
pro quo sexual harassment generally must show that tangible job benefits, such as transfers,
promotions, favourable evaluations, pay raises, and continued employment, are conditioned upon an
employee's submission to conduct of a sexual nature and that adverse job consequences have resulted
from the employee's refusal to submit to the conduct. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
Thus, the key to proving sexual blackmail is a link between rejection of the sexual advance and the
detrimental treatment of the victim. Rubenstein & De Vries, supra note 31, at 23.
34. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993). Even where sexual blackmail cannot be shown,
sexual harassment can "poison" the work environment, which may be considered a condition of the
worker's employment, by causing psychological, emotional, and physical harm to the victim.
Generally, a hostile environment claim may arise where an employee must be subjected to verbal or
physical abuse as a part of his or her employment, but does not suffer a tangible job detriment. See
also 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 14; Juliano, supra note 11, at 1575.
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that is determinative of whether he or she will harass another, but whether the
perpetrator will suffer adverse consequences from his or her behaviour.35
B. Research on Sexual Harassment in the EU
In Reuters it was observed, "[a]lthough Europeans titter about American
puritanism and hypocrisy, ... groups from Europe ... admit that sexual
harassment is a world-wide problem." '36 Generally, depending upon the country,
between twenty and seventy percent of working women in Europe claim that
they have suffered sexual harassment, but public awareness on the subject is
lacking as some people view sexual attention as flattery and others are reluctant
to file a complaint against those persons responsible for the harassment."
Therefore, "[t]he real question seems to be not whether sexual harassment is a
problem but how much of a problem it is."3
Many industrialized countries have researched the nature and extent of
sexual harassment, and some comparative research at the national and interna-
tional levels also has been conducted. Most of the research has focused upon
surveys of the working population to ascertain the percentage of men and women
affected by sexual harassment, which social and occupational categories of
workers are more likely to be subject to sexual harassment, and the opinions of
employers, managers, and workers as to how sexual harassment should be
combatted in the workplace. The results of these surveys depend upon whether
the definition of sexual harassment used was broad or narrow and the time span
covered, as well as the size and characteristics of the sample population.39
Generally, research demonstrates that sexual harassment is a real and serious
problem for a significant number of working women in the EU. The research
also indicates men have been sexually harassed, although less frequently than
women.' Research also confirms the link between the risk of sexual harass-
ment and the victim's perceived vulnerability and demonstrates that although any
person may be subjected to sexual harassment, generally it is unmarried, divorced
or separated women, young women, and women working in traditionally male
jobs who are at increased risk.4' Additionally, people who are sexually
harassed often lack interpersonal skills. Persons in these categories usually suffer
from low self esteem, and sexual harassment may further inhibit their ability to
develop self confidence.42
35. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 8.
36. U.S. Puritanism, Hypocrisy Blamed for Thomas Affair, Reuters, Oct. 16, 1991.
37. Alan Riding, Harassment or Flirting? Europe Tries to Decide, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1992,
at A8.
38. Peter Forster, Sexual Harassment at Work, 305 British Medical Journal 944 (1992).
39. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 285.
40. Id.
41. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 15.
42. Forster, supra note 38, at 945.
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Regardless of its precise incidence, available data demonstrates that sexual
harassment in the workplace in the EU is not an isolated phenomenon perpetrated
by strange, socially-deviant people. Rather, millions of people in the EU must
contend with sexual harassment as an unpleasant and unavoidable part of their
working lives."3 Thus, Mr. Rubenstein has concluded that "sexual harassment
is a problem in virtually every organization and that a substantial proportion of
work[ers] ... are the recipients of unwanted sexual attention at work."'
C. The Consequences of Sexual Harassment: Sexual Harassment as an
Individual and a Management Issue
Mr. Rubenstein has argued that "[s]exual harassment pollutes the working
environment and can have a devastating effect upon the health and safety of
those affected by it."' 5 That is, although sexual harassment may exist in both
employment and non-employment relationships, it is more insidious in
employment relationships because the victim's material survival often depends
upon the authority and control of supervisors, managers, and co-workers.'
43. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 16.
44. Michael Rubenstein, Devising a Sexual Harassment Policy, Personnel Management, Feb.
1991, at 34. For research on the extent of sexual harassment in France, see 11 ILO, supra note 16,
at 286; Rubenstein & de Vries, supra note 31, at 13. For Germany, see Rubenstein & de Vries,
supra note 31, at 13, 15; European Parliament Passes Sexual Harassment Guidelines, The Week in
Germany, Oct. 25, 1991; US. Puritanism, Hypocrisy Blamed for Thomas Affair, supra note 36;
Riding, supra note 37. For Ireland, see Lorna Siggins, Minister Reviews Harassment Law: Fear of
the Consequences Stops Many People [from] Reporting Cases of Sexual Harassment, Irish Times,
Oct. 16, 1993, at 5. For The Netherlands, see 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 286. For Portugal, see
Rubenstein & de Vries, supra note 31, at 13. For Sweden, see US. Puritanism, Hypocrisy Blamed
for Thomas Affair, supra note 36. For Spain, see 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 287; Rubenstein & de
Vries, supra note 31, at 15; Riding, supra note 37; Tim McGirk, Tawdry Don Juan Still Stalks His
Prey in the Cities of Spain, The Independent, Feb. 20, 1990, at 12. For the United Kingdom, see
Melissa Benn, UK: Sexual Harassment-Taking Liberties, The Guardian, Oct. 29, 1991; Rubenstein
& de Vries, supra note 31, at 15-16; Virginia Matthews, Media & Marketing, Daily Telegraph, May
6, 1992, at 14; Richard Palmer & Caroline Lees, Britain's Top Women Tell of Sexual Harassment,
Sunday Times, Oct. 20, 1991; Kellaway, supra note 25.
45. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 19.
46. For specific enterprise-level measures to prevent sexual harassment at the workplace,
namely with regard to unions, employers' organizations, action by governments, collective agreement
provisions, and policy statements, directives or guidelines issued by employers, see 11 ILO, supra
note 16, at 177-78, 229-32, 291-96; UK: Special Report on Management and Training-Harassment
at Work-A Management Issue, Mortgage Fin. Gazette, Apr. 6, 1992, at 46.. Interestingly, although
international and national trade unions both believe that sexual harassment will be extinguished most
effectively if there is joint employer and union action, Guy Horsmans, Professor of Law at the
University of Louvain-La-Neuve in Belgium, has observed that most Member State trade unions
believe that they are more influential and powerful if they are outside, rather than inside, the internal
governing structure of a corporation. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 230-31. In contrast, in Germany,
trade unions in some corporations enjoy a limited number of votes with regard to internal measures
governing corporate decisions. Professor Guy Horsmans, Lecture to European Economic Community
Seminar (April 12, 1994).
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Similarly, Catherine MacKinnon has observed that it is in the workplace that
victims, "dependent on their income and lacking job alternatives, are particularly
vulnerable to intimate violation in the form of sexual abuse at work."47
Accordingly, Mr. Rubenstein argues that merely addressing sexual harassment
as a social problem is not sufficient to combat the problem; rather, he asserts that
sexual harassment must be addressed so as to form the basis for a legal
prohibition.4
The harm that victims of sexual harassment experience includes anxiety,
tension, irritability, depression,49 inability to concentrate, sleeplessness, fatigue,
headaches and other manifestations of stress at work.5° Other effects on the
recipient are deterioration of personal relationships and hostility." People under
stress, of course, are likely to work more erratically, make more mistakes, and
have more accidents. Accordingly, Mr. Rubenstein argues that sexual harassment
may be viewed as a health and safety issue.52
These consequences directly imloact the profitability of an enterprise because
those workers who become ill take time off from work, thus reducing efficiency
and imposing costs on the employer and/or the Member State through sick pay
and medical insurance payments. Moreover, while they are at work, victims of
sexual harassment are likely to be less productive and less motivated, thus
affecting both the quantity and the quality of their work.53 Reduced economic
efficiency, of course, results in reduced profitability. In addition, where the
victim of sexual harassment has no effective remedy to combat it, the victim
usually finds another job, thus resulting in substantial costs to the employer in
recruiting and training replacement employees.54
47. MacKinnon, supra note 27, at 1.
48. Michael Rubenstein, Preventing Sexual Harassment at Work, 20 Indus. Rel. J. 226, 227
(1989). See infra Parts VII, VIII and IX for a discussion of whether a Regulation, Directive,
Recommendation, or European Civil Code provision is the most appropriate EU vehicle to combat
sexual harassment at work.
49. The United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal noted in a sexual harassment case:
"We are fully aware of the deep and lasting hurt which such behaviour can cause and also of the
extreme reluctance of those, like Mrs. Hawkins, who are subject to it, to make complaint." Hawkins
v. Pierce and Another, EAT/648/92 (Oct. 22, 1993).
50. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 20.
51. Forster, supra note 38, at 945.
52. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 20. Sexual harassment at work thus may be viewed as both
a management and an individual issue, recognizing that a working environment encouraging
harmonious, respectful, and dignified working relations benefits both employers and employees. See
UK: Special Report on Management and Training-Harassment at Work-A Management Issue,
supra note 46.
53. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 20.
54. Id. at 20-21. This finding was confirmed by the first British management study on attitudes
regarding the issue of sexual harassment. See Catherine Milton, Sex Pests Suffer Mild Sanctions, Fin.
Times, Jan. 11, 1992, § 1, at 5. With regard to such attitudes, reporter Sue Kernaghan has
commented:
Sex pests at work are facing changes in the law and in employers' attitudes.... Can a
pat on the bottom really affect the bottom line? It can now. Changes in legislation and
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The lack of complaints about sexual harassment does not necessarily mean
that an enterprise is not affected by it; some employees may not complain
because of embarrassment, fear of reprisals, or belief that no action will be taken
to remedy the situation.55 Additionally, the victim of sexual harassment may
be reluctant to get his or her harasser into serious trouble and may not want
either to leave his or her job or to take his or her complaint before an industrial
tribunal.56 Moreover, as has been observed by reviewer Tariq Mundiya,
"[l]awyers, employers and policy makers should ... be aware that while
appropriate and measured legal sanctions to combat sexual harassment are vital,
overexposure of the issue of sexual harassment and growing numbers of high
profile cases may discourage women from reporting harassment and bringing
claims.""7
employers' attitudes have put sexual harassment on the workplace agenda with such force'
and financial penalties that men are crying foul....
A barrage of recent studies suggest there is an epidemic of sexual harassment at
work...
This has less to do with an upsurge of boorishness than a sea change in attitude. Now,
women (and men) are more likely to recognize harassment when it happens and complain
about it. More to the point, treatment that was once sniggered at is now being treated
with unprecedented gravity by courts, employers, and unions.
Sue Kemaghan, Men Who Flirt With Disaster, The Times (London), Sept. 16, 1993, at 14.
55. Ms. Jo Gardiner, co-author of the British Industrial Society's report on sexual harassment,
cautions employers not to be fooled into thinking that sexual harassment is not a problem in their
organization simply because complaints have not been made. Complaints are the "tip of the iceberg,"
in that although forty-five percent of respondents to the Industrial Society's survey said that they had
been sexually harassed, only five percent had used their organization's grievance procedures. This
reluctance may be due to the fact that employees fear their complaints will not be taken seriously,
that they do not know to whom they should complain, that they fear reprisals, that they believe that
there is no point in complaining that no action will be taken, or that no procedure for complaining
exists. Kernaghan, supra note 54. For example, British clearing bank ICI's policy fulfills many of
the guidelines set forth in the Code of Practice, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 138-252,
but as of 1991, ICI stated that it had not yet received a complaint, thus concluding that it did not
have a problem with sexual harassment. This conclusion, however, may be difficult to defend, given
that at the time, ICI employed over 130,000 people worldwide. Perhaps a more realistic conclusion
is that as of that time, people remained afraid to speak out. Kellaway, supra note 25.
56. UK: Special Report on Management and Training-Harassment at Work-A Management
Issue, supra note 46.
57. Tariq Mundiya, Book Review, 15 Comp. Lab. L. 119, 126 (Fall 1993). Understanding the
reluctance to report harassment may be viewed as being a part of good personnel management. In
the United Kingdom, for example, Barclays produces a leaflet on equal opportunities which specifies
what the organization means both by sexual harassment and racial harassment. A spokeswoman for
the bank comments that Barclays attempts to be flexible in dealing with sexual harassment and that
.. [t]he way we deal with harassment cases depends on individual circumstances and although our
official figures are quite low-less than 10 cases a year-we are not complacent. We are aware that
there may be a number of cases we do not hear of."' See UK: Special Report on Management and
Training-Harassment at Work-A Management Issue, supra note 46.
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IIi. GENERAL OvERviEw OF EU LAW ON SEX DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
EU law"8 progresses in an integrated system on two levels-on a Commu-
nity level and on a national level. The speed and effectiveness of implementa-
tion of standards in this integrated system is furthered by a supranational
machinery: the formulation of binding, self-executing norms combined with the
control procedures of the Commission 59 and the European Court of Justice
("ECJ").6  These norms and procedures place continuous pressure on the
58. The EU Treaties are the primary sources of EU law, carrying the same weight as the role
held by constitutions in the national legal orders. Thus, the legality of the Treaties cannot be
challenged and they have priority over all other rules of EU law. The protocols annexed to the
Treaties form an integral part of the Treaties and thus share an equal status with the Treaties. The
general provisions of each Treaty, found in the first title of each and elaborated in other parts and
titles, have an important role in the interpretation and application of other provisions by the ECJ.
Of lesser importance than the Treaties are the secondary EU laws, consisting of the EU's
Regulations, Directives, and the decisions of the EU institutions, such as the ECJ. Secondary EU
laws may not restrict the application of the provisions of the Treaties, but being derived from the
Treaties, secondary EU laws form an inseparable part of the EU legal order. Thus, it is "impossible"
to treat secondary EU law differently from the Treaties in the "hierarchical relationship between legal
orders." Tertiary EU law consists of those regulations, directives, and decisions which derive their
legal force not directly from the Treaties but from the rules of secondary EU law. The only rules
of tertiary EU law that can be relied upon are those rules whose legality flows directly from the rules
of secondary EU law. The final category of rules which comprise EU law are rules of pseudo-
legislation, applied by EU authorities, although such rules do not have any formal legislative force.
Henry G. Schermers & Denis F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities 9-11
(5th ed. 1992). Generally, decisions of the European Court of Justice are binding in their entirety
upon those to whom they are addressed and may be invoked only against the addressee of the
decision, which may be Member States, singly or collectively, or individuals. Steiner, supra note 12,
at 38.
59. Article 4 of the EEC Treaty creates four principal institutions: the Assembly, otherwise
known as the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Justice. Steiner, supra note
12, at 10. The EU Commission is the ."guardian of the Treaties,"' presently consisting of seventeen
members and chosen on the grounds of their general competence and independence. The
Commission is led by a President appointed from among the Commissioners by common agreement
of the Member States for a renewable term of two years and is divided into directorates-general, each
of which is responsible for certain aspects of EU policy. Commissioners are given responsibility for
specific directorates, which vary significantly in size and prestige. Id. at 16. The Commission has
three basic functions. First, the Commission initiates all EU action and all significant decisions made
by the Council must be made upon the basis of proposals from the Commission, subject to the
Council's power to request the Commission to undertake any studies desirable for the attainment of
common objectives. Second, the Commission plays the role of the EU's "'watchdog,"' seeking out
and terminating any infringements of EU law by Member States, and before the ECJ if necessary.
The Commission enjoys complete discretion in this matter and has extensive investigative powers.
Finally, the Commission functions as the executive of the EU, implementing, often through further
legislation, policy decisions taken by the Council. Id. at 16-17.
60. The EU's "lack of maturity" results in its needing even greater recourse to general
principles of law than is true for most national legal orders. Generally, there are three types of
general principles in the EU: compelling legal principles, regulatory rules common to the laws of
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Member States to comply with their commitments. Moreover, the uniform
interpretation by the ECJ of EU rules through the procedure of community
rulings creates a Community "common law." This regional experience may
serve as a model to benefit the international community at large.6
The EU Council of Ministers ("Council"),62 Commission6 3 and Parlia-
ment have been very active in addressing the problem of sexual harassment
the Member States, and general rules native to the EU order. Generally, compelling legal principles
take priority over other elements of EU law, except for the express provisions of the Treaties. Other
rules of national laws or of EU laws are to be relied upon only when no other sources of EU law are
available. Schermers & Waelbroeck, supra note 58, at 27-29. General principles of law constitute
an unwritten source of law applied by the ECJ. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which
pursuant to Article 38 of its Statute must apply the "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations," the ECJ is not under such formal confines. The ECJ thus looks to national laws and to the
constitutions of the Member States to develop its decisions and does not appear to require completely
identical formulations of the principle in question from all the Member States; rather, the ECJ regards
individual national rules as a source of inspiration and a guide to the solution of specific problems.
Evelyn Ellis, European Community Sex Equality Law 117 (1991). For a discussion of other sources
of law upon which the ECJ relies, including the European Convention on Human Rights, the
European Social Charter, the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission of 5 April 1977, 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1, the Preamble to the Single European Act of 1986,
and the Social Charter of December 1989, see Ellis, supra at 118-21. The European Convention on
Human Rights and the European Social Charter are indirect sources of EU law, upon which the ECJ
may rely in its own formulation of the general principles of EU law on which the EU itself is based.
Id. at 120-21.
61. Eve C. Landau, The Rights of Working Women in the European Community 16 (1985).
62. The Council, which is a political body whose goal is to ensure the attainment of the
objectives set forth in the EEC Treaty, is composed of representatives of the Member States, each
of which delegates to the Council a member. The Council has the final power of decision on most
secondary legislation and thus some control by the Member States is guaranteed. Nevertheless, the
Council usually can act only on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, and increasingly must
consult both the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. The Council must override
the Parliament's opposition to a measure or amend the Commission's proposals by a unanimous vote.
Steiner, supra note 12, at 14.
63. See supra note 59.
64. Upon its creation in 1957, the Assembly, now called the European Parliament under the
Single European Act, was composed of representatives of Member States who were required to be
members of a national parliament. Since 1979, when direct elections began, the Parliament has been
more democratic although a uniform voting procedure has not been agreed upon. Member States
now are responsible to their electorate and rarely are subject to the rigorous demands of the "dual
mandate" at home and in Europe. Because the Parliament was not intended to be a legislative body,
the original Parliament had few powers, and its functions were advisory and supervisory. Since direct
elections, however, the Parliament has taken an increasingly important consultative role in the
legislative process and has been given final authority over certain aspects of the budget. The
Maastricth Treaty also substantially increased the Parliament's powers. In its supervisory role, the
Parliament must vote the Commission into power and exercises direct political control over the
Commission, and Commissioners must reply orally or in writing to the Parliament's inquiries. In
contrast, the Council is not under the control of Parliament, but is subject to the extensive supervision
of the Parliament. The Parliament reports on the Council's activities three times a year and the
President of the Council must address the Parliament at the beginning of every year. Steiner, supra
note 12, at 11, 13.
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in the EU.65 Although Mr. Rubenstein has stated that these European instru-
ments go further than do the American EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex,' the American and European approaches to sexual harassment
essentially are equivalent.
A. Equal Opportunity Law, Labour Law, Tort Law, and Criminal Law
Equal opportunity law, labour law, tort law, and criminal law generally
regulate sexual harassment in most common-law countries and in a few civil-law
countries. Equal opportunity laws that prohibit sex discrimination in employ-
ment, and even explicitly mention sexual harassment in the text of the law, set
forth the most substantive source of protection in Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Equal opportunity laws protect both men and women if courts construe the anti-
discrimination law to cover sexual harassment.67
In most civil-law countries and in a few common-law countries, labour law
provides some protection against sexual harassment although chiefly such law is
directed at cases involving quid pro quo harassment. In Austria, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, labour law has been, or potentially could
be, used to protect against constructive or unfair dismissal based on objection to
sexual harassment pursuant to unfair dismissal provisions in legislation dealing
with contracts of employment. With regard to labour law, almost all statutes in
the EU Member States are drafted with respect to the employer's responsibility
to his or her employees, and the employer's responsibility upon his or her failure
to comply with applicable labour law provisions."
Often these specific legal provisions governing contracts of employment are
framed in terms of the duties and obligations that an employer owes a worker
and the corresponding duties and obligations that a worker owes the employer.
In Belgium, for example, employers are to show respect for "propriety and
65. See infra Parts IV, V, and VI.
66. See 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 12. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993); EEOC Policy
Guidance No. N-915-050, Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, March 19, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Employ Library, EEOMAN file. The EEOC has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
indicating a desire to consolidate the standards for determining whether conduct in the workplace
constitutes illegal harassment under various antidiscrimination statutes. 58 Fed. Reg. 189 (1993).
In March 1990, the United States EEOC issued a policy statement stating that sex-based harassment
not involving sexual activity or language may lead to Title VII liability if it is "sufficiently patterned
or pervasive" and is directed at employees because of their sex. In addition, courts in the United
States have recognized that non-sexual conduct may constitute sexual harassment. Mundiya, supra
note 57, at 120.
67. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 55.
68. Id.
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decency" during the employment relationship.69  In Italy, employers are
responsible for their employees' physical and moral integrity.0 In Portugal,
employers are required to ensure both physical and moral good working
conditions. 71 In Switzerland, employers are required to protect and respect the
employee's person and individuality with respect to the worker's health and
observance of morals.72
Tort law is another classification pursuant to which victims of sexual
harassment have found a measure of protection. A tort is a legal wrong, other
than a breach of contract, for which a court may grant a remedy, usually in the
form of damages. In most civilian jurisdictions, tort law is defined in a civil
code as the general responsibility to exercise due care towards others and the
obligation to pay for damages caused by injury that results from a failure to
exercise due care.73 Therefore, tort law includes both negligent acts resulting
from carelessness and inattention and intentional acts that cause harm. By its
nature, sexual harassment is an intentional act that qualifies as an intentional tort.
Therefore, tort law has been used as a remedy for sexual harassment in Japan,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.74 Moreover, tort law
potentially may be applicable in all countries except where a statutory scheme
provides the exclusive remedy, such as in Canada.7"
Since all persons are individually responsible for their tortious actions, it is
difficult to determine whether an employer may be held liable for his or her
employee's conduct under a theory of vicarious liability for tortious acts
committed by an employee. Usually, an employer is responsible for an
employee's actions committed within the scope of the employee's employment,
although exceptionally an employer may be held to be vicariously liable for acts
outside the scope of employment when it is equitable to do so.76 Nevertheless,
because sexual harassment is an intentional tort and intentional torts usually are
not found to be within the scope of the employer/employee relationship, it
69. Id. at 56, 79-81.
70. Id. at 56, 113-16.
71. Id. at 56, 139.42.
72. Id. at 56, 151-55.
73. For articles suggesting a duty to rescue in the context of American tort law, but not
specifically with regard to sexual harassment at the workplace, see Thomas J. Galligan, Aiding and
Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 439 (1994); Leslie Bender, Feminist
(Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts. Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 Duke L.J.
848 (1990). See also Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 Cornell L. Rev.
575 (1993); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal Ed. 3
(1988).
74. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 56. In the United States, the torts that are applicable to sexual
harassment include intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false imprisonment,
invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligent retention or supervision. Some contractual tort claims
may be applicable to sexual harassment, such as claims for wrongful discharge as a tortious breach
of public policy and tortious interference with contracts. Id.
75. Id. at 56, 83-86.
76. Id. at 59.
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sometimes is difficult to hold an employer vicariously liable for an employee's
intentional sexual harassment of another employee.", Moreover, the nature of
sexual harassment suggests that the harasser was acting for his or her own
purposes, rather than in the interest of the employer.7"
Criminal law is another classification of law potentially applicable to sexual
harassment in the workplace. Although France currently is the only EU Member
State that has a specific penal law proscribing sexual harassment,79 the criminal
laws of other EU Member States potentially are applicable to sexual harassment.
For example, the following laws may apply to sexual harassment in the
workplace: laws that proscribe the taking advantage of someone in a position
of economic dependence; sexual assault and battery statutes that include the
situation of putting someone in fear of unwanted bodily contact and the actual
touching of intimate body parts; and indecent assault, indecent behaviour, and
immoral conduct laws. More general criminal laws involving general assault and
battery also may be applicable where specific sexual aggression criminal laws do
not exist.80
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 57. All residents and foreign non-residents in France are subject to the French Penal
Code. Id. The text of Article 222-32-1 voted by the French National Assembly became effective
when the new Penal Code was adopted in 1993. The new text is based upon the principle of
prohibiting an abuse of authority to obtain sexual favors; therefore, the new text addresses harassment
by supervisors only, rather than harassment by colleagues or non-employees. Abuse of authority to
pressure a person for sexual favours may be applied in the employment context and in other
situations where a person has authority. See 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 98; Journal Official, No.
107[1]AN(CR), 7017 (Dec. 3, 1991). Under this law, the "act, by anyone abusing authority that is
conferred by his or her position to pressure [someone] with the intention of obtaining sexual favors,
is punishable." Although "sexual harassment" is named in the title of the law, neither the words
"sexual harassment" nor "sexual aggression" appear in the text itself. See 11 ILO, supra note 16,
at 97. Although they do not explicitly mention the term, several other provisions of the French Penal
Code may be used to address sexual harassment at work. Because all persons residing in France are
subject to the French Penal Code, the employer, supervisors, colleagues, and non-employees, such
as clients or customers, may be liable if they commit behaviour constituting sexual harassment that
constitutes a criminal offence. The principle of vicarious liability, however, could not be applied to
hold the employer liable for a supervisor's or a worker's criminal actions. See, e.g., Article 309
(penal provision prohibiting assault and battery); Article 186 (unjustified violence by a public
official); Articles 283, 284 (indecent conduct by use of the press and related media); Article 330
(offence against public decency); Article 333 (indecent behaviour); and Articles 187-1, 187-2, 416,
116-1 (discrimination on the basis of sex may be applied to actions constituting sexual harassment).
See also 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 98-99. For commentary on the recent French law, see Susan Bell,
Office Flirt Gets Slap on Wrist, The Times (London), Sept. 2, 1991; Barry James, A French
Revolution: Judge Gives Suspended Jail Terma to Male Boss for Sexual Harassment, Int'l Herald
Trib., Jan. 18, 1992; Frances Kerry, French Bottom-Pinchers Could Face Prison, Reuters, April 29,
1992; William Langley, No Flirting Please, We're French, Evening Standard, Jan. 13, 1992, at 19;
Alan Riding, France Rethinks Its Wink at Sexual Harassment, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1992, § 1, at 9.
80. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 49, 53.
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B. Sanctions and Remedies
Generally, there are two types of remedies and two types of sanctions
available to victims of sexual harassment. The most common form of remedies
in the EU for sexual harassment is damages which represent the actual and
pecuniary harm the victim suffered, such as a loss in income resulting from
being dismissed or the failure to get a promotion and nonpecuniary damages
including moral damages or compensatory damages. These latter damages,
which generally are more available in tort than in contract actions, attempt to
compensate the victim financially for injury to feelings, mental anguish, and
humiliation caused by sexual harassment and may be extremely important
because otherwise a victim of hostile environment sexual harassment would not
be entitled to monetary recovery as no tangible pecuniary job benefit was
affected."' Although victims of harassment in the UK are entitled to compensa-
tory damages for lost earnings and physical and mental distress," the new
French law prohibiting sexual harassment fines harassers but does not expressly
allow the victim to recover compensatory damages.8 3
The second type of remedy available to victims of sexual harassment is a
court order requiring that an employer or harasser cease doing the prohibited
activity. The court also could order the employer to do certain acts that would
remedy the damage caused, such as reinstatement of the victim, transfer of the
harasser, or the adoption of an affirmative policy against sexual harassment."
The most common form of sanctions is for the harasser to be disciplined by
the employer through a reprimand, transfer, demotion, temporary suspension of
service, or actual dismissal. This disciplinary authority is inherent in the power
of the private employer and is found in the public service through the civil
servants' regulations. However, this authority is tempered by the principle of the
proportionality of the sanction to the seriousness of the offence committed.
Criminal penalties also may apply to sexual harassment, such as fines or, less
frequently, prison terms.
8 5
Mediation, which is not uncommon in civil-law countries such as France, is
an interesting and potentially successful alternative to the adjudicatory construct
81. Id. at 60. One commentator has argued for substantial compensation for victims of sexual
harassment both "because sexual harassment is a form of personal injury" and because substantial
compensation may deter future harassment. In connection therewith, she argues that whereas
compensatory damages are an incentive for employers to adopt company policies against sexual
harassment and to encourage behavioural change in the workplace, individual fines usually transform
sexual harassment into a question of the appropriateness of an individual's behaviour rather than
focus on the perpetuation of a hostile environment or of social attitudes tolerating discrimination.
See Victoria A. Carter, Working on Dignity: EC Initiatives on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,
12 J. Intl. L. Bus. 431, 450 (1992).
82. See Carter, supra note 81, at 449.
83. Id. at 449-50.
84. Id. at 445-46.
85. Id. at 437.
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relied upon by most sanctions. Unlike the adjudicatory construct, which
emphasizes the adversarial roles of the parties and may result in the imposition
of extreme sanctions instead of a workable compromise, mediation would attempt
to reconcile the parties, if possible, and to resolve the underlying issues through
a workable scheme that accommodates the interests of both the employer and the
employees.
C. Procedures
Special procedures regarding sexual harassment usually are found in equal
opportunity statutes, such as a special equal opportunity commission, human
rights commission, board, ombudsman, or commissioner that has the authority
to receive and investigate claims of sexual harassment. These procedures are
found in the equal opportunity laws of Australia, Canada, Finland, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States." With the
exception of New Zealand, which has novel and elaborate procedures defined
under its employment contract law for proceeding with sexual harassment claims
as a personal grievance against an employer, the Member States of the EU do
not have specific procedures to handle claims of sexual harassment under labour
laws. This also is the case with torts, which are processed in ordinary courts as
are other civil complaints. With respect to criminal cases, prosecutorial
discretion controls whether a claim of sexual harassment is prosecuted, except
in the United Kingdom where private criminal prosecutions are available. 8
D. Burden of Proof
One important issue regarding the remedies available to a litigant under the
Equal Treatment Directive8 is the burden of proof required before a remedy
should be granted. Currently in the EU, the burden of proof in a sexual
harassment complaint rests completely upon the complainant. Nevertheless, this
allocation of the burden of proof has been challenged. On 4 October 1991, the
European Commission consulted the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 198 of the EEC Treaty establishing the EU, on a draft of the Commission
Recommendation on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work.
On 30 October 1991, the Economic and Social Committee adopted an Opinion
on this draft. Among other things, the Economic and Social Committee
commented that:
86. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 60, 67-72 (Australia), 82-86 (Canada), 94-96 (Finland), 125-30
(the Netherlands), 131-34 (New Zealand), 135-37 (Norway), 147-50 (Sweden), and 160-73 (United
States).
87. Id. at 60-61.
88. See infra Part IV.
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[it was] crucial to the whole exercise that a fair and even-handed
approach be instituted when complaints procedures are opened, so that
the onus of proof is not exclusively borne by either the complainant or
the alleged harasser. This is why the Committee would once again urge
the Council to consider approving the long-standing Commission
proposal on modifying the burden of proof in sexual discrimination
cases. s9
IV. THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE
A. General Background of the Equal Treatment Directive
EU law on sex discrimination begins with Article 119' of the EEC Treaty,
which sets forth a general principle of equal pay for equal work for men and
women:
Each member State shall during the first stage ensure and subse-
quently maintain the application of the principle that men and women
should receive equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or
minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash
or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect
of his employment from his employer.
89. 1992 O.J. (C 14) 4, Article 1.6. Observe that the Commission has proposed an identical
Directive on the reversal of the burden of proof in the area of equal treatment, but the Council has
not yet adopted this proposal. See Proposal for a Council Directive on the Burden of Proof in the
Area of Equal Pay and Equal Treatment for Women and Men, 1988 O.J. (C 176) 6. For a view on
allocating the burden of proof in EU sexual harassment cases, see Carter, supra note 81, at 446-48.
For views on allocating the burden of proof in American sexual harassment cases, see Juliano, supra
note 11, at 1576; Jolynn Childers, Note, Is there a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A
Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 Duke L. J. 854,
863 (1993).
90. Perhaps the most important general principle of law with respect to the issue of sexual
harassment at work is the principle of non-discrimination. In EU law, the ECJ has given considerable
attention to guaranteeing equality and to preventing discrimination. In fact, the ECJ has accepted the
principle of equal treatment as a superior rule of law and has recognized the general principle of
equality as one of the fundamental principles of EU law. The EEC Treaty itself prohibits
discrimination, defined as unequal treatment in situations that are identical or comparable, in Article
119, which sets forth the principle of equal pay for equal work; in Article 7, which prohibits
discrimination on grounds of nationality, as do many Regulations; and in Article 40(3), prohibiting
discrimination in the agricultural sector. Discrimination also is prohibited in the rules on the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. Different treatment, however, does not constitute
discrimination when it is objectively justified or, with respect to economic matters, is not arbitrary.
Schermers & Waelbroeck, supra note 58, at 69-70; Steiner, supra note 12, at 27.
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Nevertheless, the principle of equal pay for equal work could not be applied
unless there existed equality in conditions of employment, which the Equal
Treatment Directive sought to address. The Equal Treatment Directive, however,
was not only a response to the limitations inherent in Article 119 of the EEC
Treaty. The origin of the Equal Treatment Directive began with the more
general developments within the EEC when the social aspects of the common
market became a matter for serious consideration. The major catalyst for
Community social policy development began with the summit meeting of
October 1972, held in Paris. The Heads of State and Heads of Government
emphasized that they gave as much importance to rigorous action in the social
field as they did to the achievement of the Economic and Monetary Union and
thought it was essential to ensure the increasing involvement of labour and
management in the economic and social decisions of the Community. Accord-
ingly, in 1973 the Commission drafted a proposal for a social programme and
on 21 January 1974 the Council of Ministers passed a resolution initiating the
Social Action Programme. 91
The chief objectives of the Social Action Programme were: (1) full and
better employment at community, national, and regional levels, which is an
essential condition for an effective social policy; (2) improvement of living and
working conditions so that they may be harmonious while improvement is being
achieved; and (3) increased involvement of management and labour in the
economic and social decisions of the Community and of workers. The Council
called for measures to achieve equality between men and women with respect to
access to employment, vocational training, advancement and working conditions,
including pay; and to reconcile the family responsibilities of all people with their
professional aspirations. 92
Accordingly, in 1975 the Commission drafted a Memorandum on the
situation of working women in the Community and a draft Directive which was
to meet the difficulties described in the Memorandum.93 Although the
Commission realized that problems of job segregation resulting from cultural,
historical, and social barriers could not be met by legislative action alone, the
Commission recognized that legislation was an appropriate means for reaching
the goal of equal treatment. The Social Action Programme itself, however, could
not serve as a juridical basis for a directive as Community directives must be
issued in accordance with the provisions of the EEC Treaty."
91. Sacha Prechal & Noreen Burrows, Gender Discrimination Law of the European Community
104 (1990).
92. Id. at 105.
93. Id. See COM (75)36 final.
94. See Prechal & Burrows, supra note 91, at 43, 105. See also Article 189 of the EEC Treaty
and Steiner, supra note 12, at 20.
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While the Equal Pay Directive implemented Article 119 of the EEC Treaty,
the Equal Treatment Directive, resulting from the Council's Resolution of 21
January 1974, is based upon Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. The Preamble of
the Equal Treatment Directive sets forth its specific goals:
Whereas Community action to achieve the principle of equal
treatment for men and women in respect of access to employment and
vocational training and promotion and in respect of other working
conditions also appears to be necessary; whereas equal treatment for
male and female workers constitutes one of the objectives of the
Community, in so far as the harmonization of living and working
conditions while maintaining their improvement are "inter alia" to be,
furthered.
Given these broad objectives, the Equal Treatment Directive was based not
upon Article 100 of the EEC Treaty (the "harmonization" Article), but upon
Article 235, which provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of
the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
This general power has been used as a basis -for legislation on matters
concerning the equal treatment for men and women, which was within the broad
goals of the Community as set forth in the preamble, but which was not
specifically addressed in the EEC Treaty.
B. Substantive Rights Given by the Equal Treatment Directive
Article 1 of the Equal Treatment Directive sets forth its purpose:
The purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member
States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards
access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational training
and as regards working conditions .... This principle is hereinafter
referred to as the "principle of equal treatment."95
Article 2 of the Directive addresses sex discrimination on the grounds of
marital or family status and thus is inapplicable to the issue of sexual harass-
95. Council Directive 76/207, art. 1, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40.
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ment. Articles 3 ,"e 4,97 and 598 of the Directive, however, are crucial for
96. Article 3 of the Directive provides:
1. Application of the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in the conditions, including selection criteria,
for access to all jobs or posts, whatever the sector or branch of activity, and to all levels
of the occupational hierarchy.
2. To this end, Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment shall be abolished;
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are
included in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, internal
rules of undertakings or in rules governing the independent occupations and
professions shall be, or may be declared, null and void or may be amended,
(c) those laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment when the concern for protection which originally
inspired them is no longer well founded shall be revised; and that where
similar provisions are included in collective agreements labour management
shall be requested to undertake the desired revision.
Council Directive 76/207, art. 3, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40.
97. Article 4 of the Directive provides:
Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to access to all types and to
all levels, of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and
retraining, means that Member States -shall take all necessary measures to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment shall be abolished;
(b) any provisions coitrary to the principle of equal treatment which are
included in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, internal
rules of undertakings or in rules governing the independent occupations and
professions shall be, or may be declared, null and void or may be amended;
(c) without prejudice to the freedom granted in certain Member States to
certain private training establishments, vocational guidance, vocational training,
advanced vocational training and retraining shall be accessible on the basis of
the same criteria and at the same levels without any discrimination on grounds
of sex.
Council Directive 76/207, art. 4, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40.
98. Article 5 of the Directive provides:
1. Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions,
including the conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be
guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex.
2. To this end, Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment shall be abolished;
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which are
included in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, internal
rules of undertakings or in rules governing the independent occupations and
professions shall be, or may be declared, null and void or may be amended,
(c) those laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment when the concern for protection which originally
inspired them is no longer well founded shall be revised; and that where
similar provisions are included in collective agreements labour management
shall be requested to undertake the desired revision.
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addressing sexual harrassment.9
C. Direct Effect of Equal Treatment Directive
A major problem with the Equal Treatment Directive has been whether it is
directly effective.Ire That is, while a claim for equal pay under Directive 75/117
might be brought under Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, a claim for equal treatment
may not be brought under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty because this Article
merely sets forth the general law-making powers of the EEC. Although it is
established that a Directive may be vertically effective against the State, it is
doubtful whether a Directive can be invoked against the State in its capacity as
employer. Even more questionable is the issue of whether a Directive might be
horizontally effective against a private person, such as a private employer.'0 '
Although the Equal Treatment Directive does not specifically address sexual
harassment, it is significant that the Directive prohibits any form of sex discrimina-
tion as regards access to employment, vocational training, promotion, and working
conditions. Moreover, the Directive requires Member States to introduce measures
to enable employees to deal with violations of the principle of equal treatment and
to protect those employees who seek to enforce compliance. 2
The ECJ has regarded the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of sex
as a positive and enforceable right and usually exercises its powers of judicial
review on this matter. The Court's liberal interpretation of the Equal Treatment
Council Directive 76/207, art. 5, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40.
99. Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive requires Member States to introduce into their
national legal systems such remedies as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves
to have been wronged by failure to apply to them the principle of equal treatment within the meaning
of Articles 3, 4, and 5 to pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to other
competent authorities. Council Directive 76/207, art. 6, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40. This provision is
unusual and is not found in most Directives.
100. The European Community Treaties that have been incorporated into the laws of Member
States generally are directly applicable; that is, applicable as part of each Member States' internal
legal system. Consequently, EU law may form the basis of rights and obligations enforceable by
individuals before their national courts. Also termed "directly applicable" are provisions of
international law which may be applied by national courts at the suit of individuals. The confiusion
in these terms has led European Union scholar Josephine Steiner to use the term "directly effective"
or "capable of direct effects" to refer to those provisions of EU law which give rise to rights or
obligations which individuals may enforce in their national courts. Steiner, supra note 12, at 24.
A "vertical direct effect" reflects the relationship between individual and State, whereas a "horizontal
direct effect" reflects the relationship between individual and individual. Id. at 27. Section 2(1) of
the European Communities Act provides for the direct application of Community law but does not
offer any guidance as to which provisions of EEC law are to be directly effective. Article 189 of the
EEC Treaty provides that Regulations are "directly applicable," but the ECJ, principally pursuant to
its jurisdiction under Article 177, has extended the principle of direct effects to Treaty articles,
Directives, Decisions, and to provisions of international agreements to which the EEC is a party. Id.
at 25.
101. Steiner, supra note 12, at 267.
102. Ellis, supra note 60, at 134-54.
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Directive is attributable in part to its wish to further the general principle of equality
of the sexes. 3 In fact, the ECJ has held that Article 3 of the Equal Treatment
Directive has direct effect, thus allowing a EU citizen to enforce the Equal
Treatment Directive directly against an organ of the State, but not against a private
body."0  Similarly, the ECJ has held that Article 4 of the Equal Treatment
Directive is directly effective." Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive also
is directly effective.' 6
Whether Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive is applicable to cases
involving sexual harassment alleged against an organ of the State is an unresolved
question. However,
[t]here seems little doubt that most forms of sexual harassment mi the
work-place are forbidden by Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive:
to subject a woman employee to sexual harassment is not to grant her
equal working conditions to those enjoyed by her male colleagues, without
discrimination on grounds of sex.1
0 7
Nevertheless, the principle that sexual harassment, without more, constitutes
unlawful discrimination is rare. It is only in the UK and Ireland that there is
relatively unequivocal acceptance that sexual harassment itself constitutes sex
discrimination."8
D. Remedies Available for Breach of the Equal Treatment Directive
Article 7 of the Directive is notably broad in its inclusion of those who have
merely made a complaint rather than only those who have actually begun legal
103. Id. at 131.
104. Id. at 137-39. See Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the RUC, 1986 E.C.R.
1651 (Article 4 of the Equal Treatment Directive confers an enforceable right on a policewoman to
the same type of firearms training as was provided to her male colleagues); Case 177/88, Dekker v.
Stichting Vormingscentnum Voor Jonge Volwassen Plus, 1991 I.R.L.R. 27 (Article 3 of the Equal
Treatment Directive forbade an employer from refusing to employ a pregnant woman, who otherwise
was suitable for the job); Case 179/88, Handels-OG Kontorfunkionaeremes Forbund I Danmark v.
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (acting for Aldi Marked K/S), 1991 I.R.L.R. 31 (this principle holds
good throughout the relevant period of maternity leave); Case 165/82, Commission v. UK, 1983
E.C.R. 3431 (Commission alleged that as of 1982 no legislative instrument in force in the UK
provided that discriminatory provisions contained in all collective agreements, rules of undertakings,
or rules governing independent occupations were, or could be declared to be void; Court held that
the Directive covers all collective agreements without distinction as to the nature of the legal effects
which they do or do not produce; UK responded by enacting section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act
of 1986, which provides for the automatic invalidity of discriminatory provisions contained in
collective agreements, employers' rules and the rules of trade unions, employers' associations,
professional organizations, and qualifying bodies).
105. Ellis, supra note 60, at 141. See Case 222/84, Johnston, 1986 E.C.R. 1651.
106. Ellis, supra note 60, at 141.48.
107. Id. at 149.
108. Id. See also Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 15.
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proceedings and narrow in its protection only against dismissal and not against
other forms of detrimental treatment by the employer. Nevertheless, the wording
of Article 7 implies that there must be effective protection against dismissal
provided in national law."°
Nevertheless, the remedies available for the breach of the Equal Treatment
Directive are not specific. and thus do not guarantee an appropriate remedy in
matters involving sexual harassment."0 That is, although Article 189 of the
Treaty of Rome delegates to Member States the freedom to choose the manner
of ensuring that a Directive is implemented, they nevertheless are obligated to
ensure that they comply with the substance of the Directive. Because the Equal
Treatment Directive is not a criminal statute, it does not prescribe any specific
remedies for sex discrimination and leaves the crafting of such remedies to the
courts. Pursuant to Article 6, however, there must be proper judicial remedies
that are sufficient to fulfill the objectives of the legislation. Therefore, although
Article 6 is not specific enough to require the existence of a specific remedy,
such as an injunction, it potentially may be used by litigants in national courts
to challenge unduly burdensome restrictions placed on those remedies which are
available. The Equal Treatment Directive, however, can only be enforced against
organs of the State."'
To combat the reality that a Directive cannot of itself impose obligations on
private parties, and rather than focusing upon whether Article 6 of the Equal
Treatment Directive confers vertical or horizontal effects, one may look to
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, which requires States to "take all appropriate
measures" to ensure the fulfillment of their Community obligations. The ECJ
has held that this Article applies to all the authorities of a Member State,
including the courts, and the courts of Member States must interpret national law
in such a way as to ensure that the objectives of the Directive are achieved." 2
Therefore, although Community law is not applied directly and, thus, is not
directly effective, it nevertheless may be applied indirectly as domestic law by
means of its interpretation."' The success of this principle of indirect effects,
however, depends upon the extent to which national courts believe themselves
to have discretion, under their own constitutional rules, to interpret domestic law
to comply with Community law. Nevertheless, this view establishes that national
courts must as much as possible interpret national law with regard to the wording
and purpose of the Directive so that they might achieve the result purposed by
109. Id. at 161.
110. Id. at 149.
111. Id. at 152-53. See Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R.
1891.
112. See Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (case 14/83) and Harz v. Deutsche Tradex
GmbH (case 79/93). See also Steiner, supra note 12, at 34.
113. Steiner, supra note 12, at 34.
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the Directive. This obligation is applicable whether the national provisions in
question were adopted before or after the Directive." 4
V. RESOLUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE DIGNITY OF WOMEN AND MEN
AT WORK115
In May 1990, the Council of the European Communities adopted a resolution
on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work."" The Council
noted that unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct based on sex
affecting the dignity of women and men at work, including the conduct of
superiors and colleagues, is unacceptable and "may, in certain circumstances, be
contrary to the principle of equal treatment within the meaning of Articles 3, 4,
and 5 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976."
'
"
7
The Council also noted that in accordance with its recommendation of 13
December 1984 on the promotion of positive action for women, many Member
States had carried out a variety of positive action measures and actions having
a bearing on respect for the dignity of women ,at the workplace; that the
European Parliament in its resolution of 11 June 1986 on violence against
women"' had called on national authorities to achieve a legal definition of
114. Id. at 35-37.
115. See also Council Recommendation of 13 December 1984 on the Promotion of Positive
Action for Women, 1984 O.J. (L 331) 34-35, in which the Council recommended to the Member
States that they "adopt a positive action policy designed to eliminate existing inequalities affecting
women in working life and to promote a better balance between the sexes in employment" and "take
steps to ensure that positive action includes as far as possible actions having a bearing on the ...
respect for the dignity of women at the workplace." See also Resolution on Violence Against
Women, 1986 O.J. (C 176) 73-83, adopted by the European Parliament in June 1986, stating their
"regard to the United Nations Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women" and "taking the view that the quest for a policy to combat violence against women and girls
is part of an emancipation policy aimed at eliminating inequality and achieving equality between the
sexes.
116. 1990 O.J. (C 157) 3-4. In its Resolution, the Council adopted language similar to that used
in the United States' Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines. See generally Nicolle R. Lipper,
Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Worlplace: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the
United States, 13 Comp. Lab. L. 293, 295 (1992).
117. 1990 O.J. (C 157) 3-4.
118. On December 25, 1993, the European Parliament also approved a Commission proposal on
a medium-term programme (1994-1999) for the war against social exclusion and to promote solidarity
and suggested measures aimed specifically at women, such as a Directive on sexual harassment at
work. EU: Parliament Wants Poverty Programme Strengthened and Specific Measures for Women,
Agence Europe, Feb. 26, 1994. In February, 1994, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
stating that Member States should adopt legislation requiring companies to appoint an in-house
counsellor to address cases of sexual harassment. The non-binding resolution also stated that
employers should incorporate measures and penalties to prevent sexual harassment in the internal
rules of the company. Social Affairs Commissioner Padraig Flynn told the Parliament that "'[t]he
Commission is in fact trying to highlight, through the (publication of a) guide on sexual harassment,
the desirability, indeed the necessity, of taking such measures."' See Sexual Harassment Counsellor
4LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
sexual harassment; that the Council was anxious to take account of a study
finding that sexual harassment is a serious problem for many working women in
the labour market; and that the Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities
between Women and Men, in its opinion of 20 June 1988, had unanimously
recommended that there be a recommendation and code of conduct on sexual
harassment in the workplace covering harassment of both sexes." 9
The Council also:
1. Affirm[ed] that conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct based
on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work, including
conduct of superiors and colleagues, constitutes an intolerable violation
of the dignity of workers or trainees and is unacceptable if:
(a) such conduct is unwanted, unreasonable and offensive to the
recipient;
(b) a person's rejection of, or submission to, such conduct on the part
of employers or workers (including superiors or colleagues) is used
explicitly or implicitly as a basis for a decision which affects that
person's access to vocational training, access to employment, continued
employment, promotion, salary or any other employment decisions;
and/or
(c) such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile or humiliating working
environment for the recipient.'
The Council also called on Member States to develop campaigns of
information and awareness for employers and workers to counter sexual
harassment; to promote awareness that sexual harassment may be contrary to the
principle of equal treatment; to remind employers that they have a responsibility
to ensure that the work environment is free from sexual harassment and
retaliation against a person complaining of sexual harassment or against a person
wishing to give, or giving, evidence in the event of a complaint; to develop
appropriate measures in accordance with national legislation in the public sector,
which may serve as an example in the private sector; and to consider that both
sides of the industry could examine in the collective bargaining process the
question of including appropriate clauses in agreements, aimed at achieving a
work environment free of sexual harassment and free of retaliation against its
victims.'2
The Council requested the Commission to draw up by 1 July 1991 a "code
of conduct on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work which
will provide guidance on initiating and pursuing positive measures designed to
Needed in Companies, Says EP, Reuter European Community Rep., Feb. 11, 1994.
119. 1990 O.J. (C 157) 3-4.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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create a climate at work in which women and men respect one another's human
integrity. ' 22
Finally, the Council requested that the institutions and organs of the
European Communities respect the concept that sexual harassment constitutes an
intolerable and unacceptable violation of the dignity of workers or trainees and
develop positive action measures aimed at achieving a work environment free of
sexual harassment and free of retaliation against its victims."
VI. COMIssioN RECOMMENDATION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE DIGNITY OF
WOMEN AND MEN AT WORK.
12
'
Pursuant to the Council's 27 June 1990 Resolution on the protection of the
dignity of women and men at work,'" in November 1991, the Commission
adopted a Recommendation on the Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men
at Work (the "Recommendation"), 26 to which was annexed a Code of Practice
(the "Code")'" on measures to combat sexual harassment.
The Commission adopted the Recommendation and the Code on an initiative
by Mrs. Vasso Papandreou, EC Commissioner for Social Affairs. The purpose
of the Code is to give practical guidance to employers, trade unions, and
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. In 1993, the Commission also published the booklet How to Combat Sexual Harassment
at Work, which is the latest initiative from the Commission on addressing the issue of sexual
harassment in the workplace. Based on the Commission's Code of Practice, which was published
in 1991, the booklet consists of a two-pronged approach: to prevent harassment from occurring and
to establish measures of addressing it once it has occurred. The Booklet urges companies to issue
a statement specifically describing what constitutes harassment, making it absolutely clear that such
behaviour is unacceptable and describing a procedure through which employees may complain. The
Booklet also suggests that employees be informed about the policy, that responsibility should be
placed on managers to ensure that harassment does not occur in their areas, that employers provide
waining for managers and for staff processing sexual harassment complaints, that they designate
someone to give advice and assistance, that they ensure that cases are investigated quickly and by
a committee set up for the purpose, and that employers give suitable disciplinary measures to guilty
parties. See Lucy Kellaway, Curbing the Office Pest, Fin. Times, Sept. 17, 1993, at 12.
125. See also Council Declaration of 19 December 1991, 1992 O.J. (C 27) 1, on the
implementation of the Commission Recommendation on the protection of the dignify of women and
men at work, including the Code of Practice to combat sexual harassment, in which the Council also
endorsed the general objective of the November 1991 Commission recommendation, which invited
the Member States to develop and implement coherent, integrated policies to prevent and combat
sexual harassment at work, taking account of the Commission Recommendation.
126. 1992 O.J. (L 49) 1-2.
127. 1992 O.J. (L 49) 3-8. Despite its title, the Code of Practice does not appear to be a true
civilian code. See generally Alain A. Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code,'44 Tul. L. Rev.
693 (1970); Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 La. L. Rev. 1073
(1988).
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employees on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work, which
guidance is urged to be implemented in the public and the private sectors."
The expert report done on behalf of the Commission found that sexual
harassment is a serious problem for many working women and for some men in
the EU and that research in Member States had proven that sexual harassment
at work was not an isolated phenomenon. The report found that sexual
harassment pollutes the working environment, can have a devastating effect upon
the health, confidence, morale, and performance of those affected by it, requires
costs to the employers and has a direct impact on the profitability of an
enterprise.' In the report, the EU viewed sexual harassment as an obstacle
to the proper integration of women into the labour market, and the Commission
committed, in its Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities for Women
and Men (1991-1995), to encourage the development of comprehensive measures
to improve such integration.13 The Code and the Recommendation represent
the first concrete initiatives within the framework of the EU's new five-year
action programme on equal opportunities (1991-1995). 3'
A. The Recommendation
The Commission, as the guardian of the EC Treaty,32 has the duty to
ensure that equality between men and women "figures prominently in the new
EEC Treaty."'33 Notably and wisely, the Commission was careful not to draft
a detailed list of what could be considered sexual harassment in the workplace,
but instead delegated to the Member States the decisions on what actually
constitutes sexual harassment. Nevertheless, the Recommendation states that
behaviour resulting in harmful consequences to the professional life of the
victim, such as being passed over for promotion or losing his or her job because
128. See Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work: The Commission Adopts a
Recommendation and Proposes a Code of Practice, RAPID Info. Memo, July 3, 1992, at 43,
available in LEXIS, World Library, AUwld File.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. With regard to the Commission's role as a guardian of the EEC Treaty, Section 4.5 of the
Social Affairs Title of EC Commentaries states:
The Comirission, as a guardian of the EEC Treaty, has a duty to ensure that equality
between men and women figures prominently in the new Treaty on European Union....
In the [27 November 1991] Recommendation, the Commission asks Member States to
accelerate awareness of sexual harassment, which is contrary to the rights of men and
women. The Member States should set a good example by first combating the problem
of sexual harassment in their own government and civil services. They should also
encourage companies and trade unions to comply with a code of good practice.
Social Affairs Title of EC Commentaries § 4.5 (Coopers & Lybrand 1993).
133. See Social Affairs: Commission Calls for Code of Conduct on Sexual Harassment,
European Rep., July 6, 1991, § IV, at 4.
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he or she rejected sexual advances, would constitute sexual harassment.'1 The
Commission expects Member States to set an example for the private sector by
dealing effectively with sexual harassment in the civil service and to encourage
employers and trade unions to comply with the Code.13
Although the Commission Recommendation and the Code are not legally
binding, the ECJ has held that National Courts are bound to consider Commis-
sion Recommendations when deciding disputes, particularly where the Recom-
mendations clarify the interpretation of national decisions adopted to implement
the Recommendations or where they are designed to supplement binding
Community actions.136 Generally, the Commission's Recommendation makes
the following recommendations to the Member States: that they take action to
promote awareness that conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct affecting the
dignity of women and men at work is unacceptable and may, in certain
circumstances, be contrary to the principle of Equal Treatment for Men and
Women within the meaning of the Equal Treatment Directive; that Member
States implement the recommendations contained in the Commission's Code; and
that Member States encourage employers and employee representatives, including
trade unions, to implement the recommendations contained in the Code."'
B. The Code
1. In General
The Commission formally introduced the Code during a meeting in
November, 1991 in the Hague, the Netherlands. Representatives of women's
groups, trade unions, employers and governments attended the meeting.' The
stated purpose of the Code is "to give practical guidance to employers, trade
unions, and employees on the protection of the dignity of women and men at
work" and is "intended to be applicable in both the public and the private sector
and employers are encouraged to follow the recommendations contained in the
code in a way that is appropriate to the size and structure of their organiza-
tion.'"" Thus, the Code acknowledges that smaller organizations may need to
134. See Sexual Harassment: EC Recommendation on Sexual Harassment, 3 Europe
2000-Human Resources, No. 5, Aug. 1991.
135. See EC: Code of Conduct on Sexual Harassment, Accountancy, Sept. 4, 1991.
136. See Rubenstein & Do Vries, supra note 31, at 9. Additionally, the United Kingdom's
Employment Appeal Tribunal recently held that industrial tribunals may obtain guidance on sexual
harassment from Recommendations adopted by the European Commission on November 27, 1991.
See Wadman v. Carpenter Farrer Partnership, 1993 I.R.L.R. 374; see also UK: Sexual Harass-
ment-EC Guidance, Accountancy, July 1, 1993.
137. See Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work: The Commission Adopts a
Recommendation and Proposes a Code of Practice, supra note 128.
138. See Abbie Jones, Priority code: Europeans Seek Unity Against Harassment, Chicago Trib.,
Dec. 1, 1991, at 1.
139. See Articles 1.1 and 1.2 of the Code.
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adapt the Code to what is practicable, given their limited resources. In
connection therewith, the Code seeks to provide practical guidance to employers,
trade unions, and employees on the means of ensuring that sexual harassment
does not occur in the workplace, and if it does occur, that adequate procedures
are available to deal with the problem and to prevent its reoccurrence.
The Code also basically sets forth the legal position and the Council's belief
that, in certain circumstances, sexual harassment may be contrary to the principle
of equal treatment contained in the Equal Treatment Directive,"4 and makes
a series of recommendations to employers, trade unions, and employees on
practical steps, both preventative and procedural, that may be taken. These
recommendations are based on examples of current appropriate practices in the
Member States and on a draft of the Code that had been the subject of
consultation with the Member States, the social partners, and the national
equality agencies.
Wisely, the wording of the Code is deliberately general, rejecting an early
attempt to divide offensive behaviour into four rigorous categories (physical
conduct of a sexual nature, verbal conduct of a sexual nature, non-verbal conduct
of a sexual nature, and "sex-based" conduct affecting the dignity of women and
men).1 41  Instead, the wording adopted an approach similar to the EEOC's
1981 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.142
The EEOC defined this harassment as consisting of "unwelcome" sexual
advances, requests for sexual favours, and other verbal or physical sexual
conduct where the response is used as the basis for an employment decision or
where such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environ-
ment. 1 43 The Code defines sexual harassment as involving "unwanted" conduct
of a sexual nature or other conduct affecting the dignity of women and men at
work, including "unwelcome" physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct. Such
conduct is unacceptable if: (1) it is unwanted to the recipient; (2) a person's
rejection of, or submission to, such conduct by employers or workers, including
superiors or colleagues, is used explicitly or implicitly as a basis for a decision
140. Although the Code, the Council Resolution, and the Recommendation state that sexual
harassment "may in certain circumstances" be contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive, such
language is not intended by the Code to detract from the generality of that principle. Rather, such
words merely recognize that certain factual situations may exist that fall outside of the scope of the
prohibition on unequal treatment of men and women, such as where the employer neither knew nor
could have known of the harassment. Rubenstein & De Vries, supra note 31, at 27.
141. See Matthew D'Ancona, Europe Backs Code to Stop Sexual Harassment at Work, The
Times (London), Oct. 23, 1991. See also Euro-MPS Call for Code of Conduct on Sexual
Harassment, The Reuter Library Report, Oct. 22, 1991. Nevertheless, according to the UK's Equal
Opportunities Commission, the Code prohibits such "sex-based" conduct as wolf calls and pin-ups,
which give women the message that they should not be in the work environment. See Diane
Summers, Minister Finds that Sex and Politics Don't Mix, Fin. Times, March 6, 1992, at 20.
142. See Mundiya, supra note 57, at 122.
143. See David Pannick, The Euro Guide on Sexual Harassment, The Times (London), Oct. 29,
1991.
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which affects that person's access to vocational training, employment, continued
employment, promotion, salary, or any other employment decisions; and/or (3)
such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile, or humiliating working environment
for the victim.'"
2. Informal Responses in the EU
The introduction of the Code was widely welcomed in the EU, demonstrat-
ing that EU Member States recognize that they should consider the Code's
recommendations when disputes are settled and that the Code's recommendations
will be relevant as to whether an employer took reasonable steps to prevent
employees from engaging in behaviour that amounts to sexual harassment or
discrimination. 45 As observed by the Information Memo:
Sexual harassment at work could be a thing of the past after a Euro-
vote to ban it [in 1991].... The European Parliament backed new
guidelines to torpedo [unwanted]... advances.... These regulations
will try to curb both the wandering hand brigade as well as those who
think that their suggestive comments make them God's gift to the
opposite sex.'
46
Comments received on the draft by the Member States, the social partners, and
the national equity agencies were mostly favourable and helpful. 147  Joanna
144. See Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work. The Commission Adopts a
Recommendation and Proposes a Code of Practice, supra note 128.
145. See Code Reinforced, The Times (London), Sept. 24, 1991. In connection therewith, some
have argued that an employer's adoption of measures consistent with the Code of Practice should be
made directly relevant to the issue of its liability in any legal proceeding, as is the case with
American courts, which have shown considerable deference to the EEOC Guidelines in determining
employer liability. Moreover, the EEOC Guidelines have been the catalyst for the creation of many
sexual harassment policies currently in force in the United States, suggesting that the Code of
Practice, which specifically sets forth the standard of care with which employers must comply to
avoid liability, will cause enterprises in the EU to implement these measures. See also Lipper, supra
note 116, at 341.
146. See Benn, supra note 44.
147. See Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work: The Commission Adopts a
Recommendation and Proposes a Code of Practice, supra note 128. Notably, four British models
who posed topless for a London tabloid newspaper opposed the Commission's Recommendation and
Code of Practice, claiming that the Commission's proposal would ban the posting of nude pinups at
the workplace. Nevertheless, an EU Commission spokesman commented, without providing specific
reasons, that the tabloid's "Page 3 girls" would not be outlawed by the measure, so they "should have
read first and demonstrated later." See Charles Goldsmith, EC Code Proposed to Prevent Sexual
Harassment, Int'l Herald Trib., July 4, 1991. In summarizing the Recommendation and the Code,
the spokesman emphasized that sexual harassment "must have a direct impact on the working career
of the concerned employee" and that the Recommendation "result[s] from close consultation" with
Member States, trade unions, and national equality agencies. See EC Commission Issues Draft
Recommendations on Child Care, Sexual Harassment in Workplace, BNA Int'l Bus. Daily, July 5,
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Foster, chair of the Equal Opportunities Commission in the United Kingdom, and
herself a victim of sexual harassment, commented that the Code would assist
thousands of people whose careers had been damaged by harassment: "This is a
very widespread problem and the more we can discuss this issue the easier it will
be to change people's attitudes.' ' s
The Code also was endorsed by British groups campaigning for a legal
definition of sexual harassment and was welcomed by Britain's Women Against
Sexual Harassment ("WASH"), a lobby group that in 1991 expected to deal with
more than 5,500 complaints of sexual harassment. Louise Noakes, co-ordinator of
WASH, commented: "The EC has recognized sexual harassment as one of the
most important forms of discrimination in the work place and has given us a
definition which gets rid of the grey area of when behaviour becomes sexual
intimidation.' ' 49 Mr. Rubenstein, a consultant to the EC on the Code, said the
issue was not what constituted sexual harassment as much as how to give victims
the confidence to come forward with their complaints, noting "[t]here are alot of
[people] putting up with sexual harassment at work because they are not sufficient-
ly confident they will be listened to if they stand up to it."' 0
In Ireland, the Code was widely welcomed. In 1993, the Employment Equality
Agency ("EEA") and the Council for the Status of Women ("CSW") called for the
implementation in Irish law of the Code although this measure has not yet been
adopted.' Carmel Foley, who in 1993 was chief executive of the CSW and now
is chief executive of the EEA, also requested that the Recommendation become
legally binding. Ms. Foley noted that although the Irish Business and Employers'
Confederation and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions have accepted the EU
Guidelines, "it was time that they became firmly included in legislation."
'1 2
VII. REGULATION, DIRECTIVE, RECOMMENDATION, OR EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE?
Article 11 8A of the Single European Act of 1987, which grants the Council the
authority to adopt by a qualified majority directives to improve the working
environment, particularly with regard to worker healthand safety, may provide the
EU with the authority to adopt binding legislation on sexual harassment in
employment. Pursuant to this authority, the EU could adopt an amendment to the
Equal Treatment Directive, thereby widening its scope to include sexual harassment
1991. The spokesman also commented that the proposal was part of a five-year equal opportunities
program designed to bring more women into the Community's labor market. See Models Protest at
EC Code Against Sexual Harassment, Reuters, July 3, 1991.
148. See Palmer & Lees, supra note 44.
149. See Louise Hildago, EC Code to Call for Stronger Laws on Sexual Harassment, The Times
(London), Oct. 21, 1991.
150. See id.
151. See EC News in the European Press on Friday, March 19, 1993, Reuter European
Community Rep., March 19, 1993.
152. Mary Cuminis, Sex Harassment Law Urged, Irish Times, March 19, 1993, at 4.
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as a form of sex discrimination. The EU could also adopt a new directive on sexual
harassment or retain its current Recommendation. The scholars, practitioners, and
citizens discussed below have vehemently disagreed on which alternative the EU
should adopt.
A. Regulation
Elisabeth Zoller, Professor of Law at the University of Strasbourg and the
Institute of Political Science, has suggested that perhaps a "purer" approach to
combatting sexual harassment would be a Commission Regulation. rather than
merely a Recommendation. Zoller supports her suggestion with the principle of
integration," 3 which was central to the creation of the EU and which by necessity
takes away from Member States at least some of their sovereignty. That is, by
entering into the EU, the Member States sought integration, rather than merelyco-
existence or cooperation, and thereby renounced at least some of their sovereignty
on social issues such as sexual harassment. Accordingly, she argues that a
Regulation prohibiting sexual harassment would be consistent with the principle of
integration. Moreover, the fact that the Member States would thereby lose their
sovereign right to draft their own laws on the matter would be immaterial because
they, in fact, lack this sovereignty as a natural result of being members of the
EU.15
4
Perhaps, Professor Zoller is correct in her argument that a Regulation
prohibiting sexual harassment accords with the integrated nature of the EU.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to give integrated content to a Regulation prohibiting sexual harassment
in the workplace, given the hesitation the Member States have exhibited in
relinquishing their sovereignty over social matters' 5 and the deep differences in
culture among the Member States. Moreover, a Regulation would grievously
153. In principle, integration under the EEC Treaty is comprehensive and does not apply to
separate economic sectors, such as coal and steel or nuclear energy, as do the ECSC Treaty and the
Euratom Treaty, respectively. The establishment of the Common Market under the EEC Treaty,
therefore, refers to the entire sphere of economic activities in the Community. See 1 A.G. Toth,
Legal Protection of Individuals in the European Communities 102 (1978). Accordingly, in areas
within Community jurisdiction the individual becomes, through the process of integration,
"increasingly detached from the legal (legislative) authority of the Member States and subjected to
that of the Communities to the extent to which such authority is being transferred to the latter." Id.
at 104.
154. Professor Elisabeth Zoller, Lecture to European Economic Community Seminar (March 1,
1994).
155. For example, Britain has rejected the European Social Charter, which became available for
signature in October 1961 and concerns economic and social rights, requiring constructive action,
rather than a mere understanding by Member States not to interfere with such rights. Of the Member
States, only Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal have not ratified the Charter. Because the Charter
gives ratifying Member States the option to enter reservations in relation to specific Articles, there
is a substantial lack of evenness in the amount of legal commitment to this instrument. See Ellis,
supra note 60, at 118.
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exacerbate the problems inherent in the Code, particularly with regard to its lack
of "procedural morality."'5 6
B. Directive
With regard to amending the Equal Treatment Directive to include sexual
harassment, not all Member States regard sexual harassment as sex discrimination,
and these political considerations might discourage the Commission from proposing
amendments to the Equal Treatment Directive that would include sexual harass-
ment within its scope. However, with regard to a Directive specifically covering
sexual harassment, most EU institutions and experts in the subject of sexual
harassment support binding legislation in the form of a Directive, rather than a
Regulation, to prohibit sexual harassment. In fact, the EU Parliament has requested
a Council directive to make binding the action program under which the Commis-
sion proposed its recommendation on sexual harassment.'57 Moreover, a July
1991 resolution states that the Parliament "deplores" the Commission action
program because it lacks "a binding procedure for its implementation by either the
Community institutions or the Member States."'58 This Parliament resolution
responds to several requests to the Council by the Parliament's Committee on
Women's Rights, suggesting that the Council adopt a Directive on sexual
harassment.' 59
In addition, on 30 October 1991, the Economic and Social Committee of the
EU adopted an Opinion on the Commission's Recommendation on sexual
harassment in which the Committee characterized the Recommendation as a "first
step in promoting awareness, and in turn prevention of the problem." Nevertheless,
the Committee noted:
This in turn is why the Committee is disappointed that the "code of
practice" proposed is only limited to a Commission Recommendation.
Given the seriousness and widespread occurrence of sexual harassment or
of unwanted behaviour demeaning the dignity ofwomen and men at work,
and considering that Ministers have already pronounced themselves on
this problem, the Committee considers that at least a Council Recommen-
dation is required, possibly leading at a future stage, after EC-wide
156. See infra Parts VIII and IX.
157. See European Parliament Resolution on the Third Medium-Term Community Action
Programme on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Minutes of Proceedings of the Sitting of
the Parliament, July 12, 1991. See also Carter, supra note 81, at 452.
158. See European Parliament Resolution on the Third Medium-Term Community Action
Programme on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Minutes of Proceedings of the Sitting of
the Parliament, July 12, 1991, at 5. See also Carter, supra note 81, at 452.
159. See Parl. Eur. Doc. (SEC 0167) 10 (7 June 1991) (stating that the Commission action
program simply is a declaration of intentions, describing future actions to be taken by the
Commission without making binding commitments). See also Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 0358) 8 (6 Dec.
1990); Carter, supra note 81, at 452.
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monitoring, to a more binding EC instrument registering an appropriate
degree of political commitment and scrutiny."
Other commentators have agreed with the Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee. Pointing to the Parliament's Resolution of 20 May 1986 in
which the Parliament stated that sexual harassment was a violation of the principle
of equal treatment for men and women and invited the Commission to examine
labour law and non-discrimination law to determine their applicability to the issue
and to issue a Directive supplementing existing legislation if it was inadequate, and
to the Council Resolution of 13 December 1984, in which the Council asked the
Member States to take measures to ensure respect for the dignity of women at the
workplace, Mr. Rubenstein, the consultant to the Commission who assisted in
drafting the Code, has commented that he prefers formal legislation to address
sexual harassment in the workplace but that the Code is a reasonable first step.16" '
Arguing that the Code will not be entirely effective unless all employers adopt it,
Mr. Rubenstein stated: "A great many will ignore it for sure. That obviously is
inevitable."' 62
Moreover, in his 1988 Report on the Dignity of Women at Work, written at the
Commission's request, Mr. Rubenstein argues that there is a need for a separate
Community Directive on sexual harassment at work'63 and suggests that although
there would be advantages in clearly establishing that sexual harassment is unlawful
sex discrimination contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive, this would not likely
provide an effective solution to the problem of sexual harassment. Rather, Mr.
Rubenstein contends what is needed is "specific legislation to confer upon
employees a right to a working environment free of harassment and to encourage
employers to take appropriate steps to establish and maintain such a working
environment.""' Mr. Rubenstein also observes that equal treatment legislation
currently in force in the Member States is directed towards providing a remedy to
those people who are subjected to sex discrimination, rather than focussing on
preventing sexual harassment from occurring or reoccurring-goals which would
be furthered by specific legislation.
65
Mr. Rubenstein further argues that a Directive is justified because he believes
that it would greatly facilitate the Member States' obligation to take steps directed
at protecting employees against the risk of sexual harassment, given that Member
States normally would not expect employees to work with hazardous substances or
160. See Opinion on the Draft Commission Recommendation on the Protection of the Dignity
of Women and Men at Work, 1992 O.J. (C 14) 4-5. See also Dignity of Women and Men at Work
Council Recommendation Required Pending More Binding Legal Instrument, European Rep., Nov.
23, 1991, at 3.
161. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 37-39.
162. See Jones, supra note 138, at 1.
163. Rubenstein, supra note 21, at 36.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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dangerous machinery with no recourse until they have contracted a disease or
suffered an injury. In connection therewith, Mr. Rubenstein notes that because
sexual harassment damages the working environment and constitutes a risk to
health and safety, a Directive on preventing sexual harassment would support a
declared priority of the EU, as set forth in Article 11 8A of the Single European Act,
that Member States shall encourage improvements, especially in the working
environment, with respect to the health and safety ofworkers and shall have as their
objective the harmonization of conditions in this area, while maintaining the
improvements made." Similarly, Mr. Rubenstein argues for a Directive because
sexual harassment interferes with productivity, undermines employee morale,
disrupts effective working relationships, and results in absence from work and
higher turnover. Moreover, a Directive would result in greater efficiency,
competitiveness, and profitability. 67
Finally, Mr. Rubenstein suggests that a Directive would "complement existing
legislation on the realization of equal treatment for men and women" by giving
employees and prospective employees an equal opportunity to show their talents
and would widen the employer's base for recruitment and promotion.' He
concludes his argument as follows:
The author strongly believes that such objectives [to prevent and
remedy sexual harassment] can only be achieved if the Community
initiative is in the form of a Directive. The inadequacies of existing legal
remedies are so patent, the discrepancies between the provisions in
Member States so vast, that only a legal instrument with binding force will
provide the necessary impetus for voluntary action to be taken. There is
no reason to believe that moral suasion, in the form of a Recommendation
or a Code of Practice, in itself will have the impact necessary to rectify the
injustices currently suffered.
A Directive on preventing sexual harassment at work will not cost
money. Preventing sexual harassment will save more money than the cost
of permitting sexual harassment to continue. A Directive would not
represent an unnecessary burden upon employers. Sensible employers
already recognize that it is not good management to permit a working
environment which allows sexual harassment. A Directive would not
represent an intrusion of the law into the private behaviour of employees.
The distinction between relationships mutually entered into and the
imposition of unwelcome and offensive conduct, once understood, is
easily recognized. A Directive on sexual harassment would not conflict
with equal treatment legislation. Sexual harassment at work is an obstacle
which must be removed if the aspiration of equal treatment for men and
women is to be realized.
166. Id. at 37-38.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 38.
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... This generation of women has a right to expect that the laws of
Member States will protect them against the risk of sexual harassment and
allow them to pursue their working lives with dignity.'"
Perhaps, Mr. Rubenstein is correct in arguing that a Directive prohibiting
sexual harassment in the workplace would solve the non-binding nature of the
Commission's Recommendation on sexual harassment. Moreover, a Directive
might accord with the integrated nature of the EU, albeit to a lesser extent than
would a Regulation. Nevertheless, a Directive prohibiting sexual harassment
presents problems which a Recommendation evades. For example, a Directive
would require the Member States to relinquish sovereignty which they have
hesitated to abandon. 70 Moreover, although a Directive ultimately would be
implemented by each Member State in its own manner, the actual content of a
Directive would be difficult, if not impossible, to fashion because of the vast
cultural differences between the Member States. Finally, a Directive, like a
Regulation and the current Recommendation, would encounter problems with
regard to "procedural morality."'' These concerns belie Mr. Rubenstein's belief
that the Code will not be entirely effective unless all employers adopt it, for such
problems will remain even if all employers do adopt the Code.
C. Recommendation
Relatively few EU commentators supported the Commission's choice to
adopt a Recommendation," rather than a Regulation or a Directive, to combat
169. Id. at 101-02. Like Mr. Rubenstein, Victoria A. Carter has argued that binding Community
legislation in the form of a Directive, rather than merely a Recommendation, is necessary to eradicate
sexual harassment from the lives of EU workers. Carter admits, however, that offensive and harmful
behaviour of a sexual nature will not disappear from the EU merely because the EU adopts legislation
prohibiting it. See Carter, supra note 81, at 450-51. Women's organizations in the EU, such as the
European Association Against Violence Towards Women at Work and the UK Women Against
Sexual Harassment, both of which work with labour unions to raise awareness of the problems caused
by sexual harassment in the workplace, also support binding legislation to prevent sexual harassment.
They support their argument by observing that the Equal Pay Directive resulted in all Member States
adopting sufficient legal standards to achieve necessary social change. Id. at 452-53.
170. See supra note 155. Interestingly, Mrs. Nel Van Dijk, speaking for the Green Party, has
argued for a Directive to combat sexual harassment at the workplace based upon the European Social
Charter's mission of ensuring a Euro-wide social policy. See Social Charter: European Parliament
Committee Unveils Counter Proposals, European Rep., July 4, 1990, at 13. Similarly, Ms. Christine
Crawley, Chairman of the public forum sponsored by the European Union on Women's Rights, has
requested implementation of the European Social Charter through a Directive issued on sexual
harassment. See EC: Forum on Equal Pay Legislation in the Member States, Agence Europe, March
26, 1993.
171. See infra Parts VIII and IX.
172. See infra Part IX for this Article's defense of the Commission's choice of an EU
Recommendation to combat sexual harassment.
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sexual harassment at the workplace. As has been mentioned, " the European
Parliament would have preferred a Directive on the subject of sexual harassment,
but nevertheless, supported the Commission's Recommendation. A Directive, of
course, would have had "more teeth with which to fight harassment,"'7 but
Ms. Christine Crawley, Labour MEP and author of a Parliament report on the
Commission's Recommendation on sexual harassment, which was adopted by the
Parliament at its October 24 1991 session in Strasbourg, expressed support of the
Commission's Recommendation to promote dialogue in companies and to
introduce procedures to settle disputes involving sexual harassment.'7
Similarly, in London the Employment Department said that the voluntary
approach to combating sexual harassment-in the form of a Recommendation
and a Code, rather than a Directive---"is the answer."'7  In response thereto,
Ms. Crawley commented that the Recommendation offered "unambiguous
guidelines" on what kinds of behaviour were acceptable and that sexual
harassment was a complex issue.'" Moreover, Sir Leon Brittan, who was
present at the Parliament's plenary session, expressed his approval of the
Parliament's support but did not believe that a Directive should be issued on the
subject, noting that Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive provide
a legal response to most cases of sexual harassment. He also noted that the
Commission's Recommendation is designed chiefly to change people's attitudes,
which purpose was reflected in the Commission's Recommendation and its Code
of Conduct.
7 1
D. European Civil Code
Professor Guy Horsmans'" has argued that a European Civil Code, based
on the European Social Charter, rather than mere Regulations, would be an
appropriate means of regulating social conduct in the European Union. Professor
Horsmans develops his argument by noting that although the Treaty of Rome
began with purely economic purposes, today the purposes of the Treaty include
a social agenda, such as health and education. Therefore, Professor Horsmans
argues, the European Union is not so much a common market or even a
community as it is an integrated system combining economic purposes with
social welfare."s
173. See supra text accompanying notes 157-159.
174. See Sexual Harassment; European Parliament Backs Commission, European Rep., Oct. 26,
1991, at 18.
175. Id.
176. See D'Ancona, supra note 141.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 46.
180. Professor Guy Horsmans, Lecture to European Economic Community Seminar (March 24,
1994).
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Professor Horsmans notes that a current problem with European integration
is that goals that seem common in the Treaty may differ in their implementation
from one state to another and that most Member States focus only on themselves
to solve their problems. That is, the economic difficulties facing the Member
States today make it difficult to obtain good regulations, and some regulations
cannot be understood unless one understands the national problems being
addressed. Professor Horsmans, therefore, urges each Member State to take into
account the national interest of the European Union rather than merely their
respective interests, as was done with the Treaty of Maastricth. By doing so, the
Member States would make the EU more democratic and would build Europe by
the will of the people rather than their governments. Nevertheless, Professor
Horsmans laments that it is extremely difficult for Member States to relinquish
their sovereignty. Perhaps, in ten years, he hopes, the Member States will
disappear and will be replaced with an integrated European Union.'
8
'
In support of the European Civil Code, Professor Horsmans notes that the
"free market" of the European Union has not been sufficient to sustain gains in
social welfare in education, health, and housing. He observes that the "welfare
state" used to be the answer to ensuring goals of social equality. However, now
that the Member States have little money and are burdened with high unemploy-
ment, they have failed to follow through on this social agenda. Although
Professor Horsmans admits that the content of a European Civil Code regulating
social matters would be difficult to develop, much less to implement, he notes
that the European Social Charter might provide some principles for guidance.
In such a Civil Code, Professor Horsmans believes that it is not sufficient merely
to state that the State will help the poor; rather, the Code should be more
specific, such as championing equality between men and women. Rather than
being "technicians," Professor Horsmans believes we should focus on the fact
that a code is a view of normal situations for normal people in certain countries.
That is, the morality in a code should prevail over concerns about practicality.
After all, Professor Horsmans declares: "Why do you make money if you don't
take care of social rights?"1"2
Professor Horsmans' suggestion that a European Civil Code regulate social
matters, and in particular the problem of sexual harassment, may be appealing
to those who support a Regulation or a Directive, not only because such a Civil
Code would be in accordance with the integrated nature of the EU, but also
because it would create binding legislation on the Member States. Nevertheless,
as would be the case with a Regulation or Directive prohibiting sexual
harassment in the workplace, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to give content to a European Civil Code article prohibiting sexual harassment,
given the hesitation the Member States have exhibited in relinquishing some of
their sovereignty over social matters and the deep differences in culture among
181. Id.
182. Id.
1127
8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the Member States. In addition, a Civil Code provision would encounter
problems with procedural morality. 3
VIII. THE DILEMMA OF KING REx
A. Introducing: King Rex!
In The Morality of Law,'8' Lon Fuller sets forth his theory of "procedural
morality" by discussing "eight ways to fail to make law." Fuller begins with an
allegory concerning the "unhappy reign of a monarch who bore the convenient,
but not very imaginative and not even very regal sounding name of Rex."'85
Like those people in the EU who have attempted to eliminate sexual harassment
in the workplace, King Rex "came to the throne filled with the zeal of a
refonner. He considered that the greatest failure of his predecessors had been
in the field of law. For generations the legal system had known nothing like a
basic reform."'" Unfortunately, although King Rex was resolved to remedy
this problem and to "make his name in history as a great lawgiver, ' 87 he
"failed spectacularly, since not only did he not succeed in introducing the needed
reforms, but he never even succeeded in creating any law at all, good or
bad."' 88
Because he believed that he needed a clean slate on which to write, King
Rex's first official act was to announce to his subjects the immediate repeal of
all existing law. He then drafted a new code but found himself to be incapable
of making even the simplest generalizations because, though not lacking in
confidence with regard to deciding specific controversies, the effort to give
articulate reasons for any particular conclusion "strained his capacities to the
breaking point.' ""
Aware of his limitations, King Rex relinquished the idea of a code and
announced to his subjects that henceforth he would act as a judge in any disputes
that might arise among them. The King, thus, hoped that by judging a variety
of cases, his latent powers of generalization might develop and, proceeding case
by case, he gradually would develop a system of rules that could be incorporated
into a code. Unfortunately, King Rex's venture failed completely in that after
he had handled literally hundreds of decisions, neither he nor his subjects could
detect in those decisions any pattern whatsoever. Moreover, their confusion was
183. See infra Parts VIII and IX.
184. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-41 (1964), reprinted in Christie & Martin, supra
note 3, at 216. For commentary on Fuller's legal theory, see Robert S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller et
al., Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 Am. J. Juris. 202 (1981).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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compounded by any tentatives toward generalization in the King's opinions
because these generalizations gave false leads to his subjects and threw his own
meager powers of judgment off balance in his decision of later cases./"
After this fiasco, King Rex decided to make a fresh start, and his first move
was to subscribe to a course of lessons in generalization. Accordingly, he
resumed the project of a code and, after many hours of solitary labour, prepared
a fairly lengthy document. Not being confident, however, that he had fully
overcome his previous defects, the King announced to his subjects that he had
written a code and henceforth he would be governed by it in deciding cases but
for an indefinite future the contents of the code would remain an official state
secret, known only to him and to his scrivener. To the King's surprise, his
subjects deeply resented this sensible plan and declared that it was "very
unpleasant to have one's case decided by rules when there was no way of
knowing what those rules were."''
Stunned by this rejection, King Rex decided that life had taught him one
clear lesson, namely, that it is easier to decide things with the aid of hindsight
than it is to attempt to foresee and to control the future. The King reasoned that
hindsight not only made it easier to decide cases, but it also made it easier to
give reasons. Accordingly, the King decided that at the beginning of each
calendar year he would decide all the controversies that had arisen among his
subjects during the previous year and he would accompany his decisions with a
full statement of reasons. These reasons, naturally, would be understood as not
controlling decisions in future years, for that would defeat the whole purpose of
the new arrangement, which was to gain the advantages of hindsight. The King
confidently announced his new plan to his subjects. His subjects quietly
explained that when they said that they needed to know the rules, they meant that
they needed to know them in advance so that they could act on them. The King
muttered that they might have made that point,a little clearer but said that he
would see what could be done.
King Rex now realized that he could not escape from a published code
declaring the rules to be applied in future disputes. The King accordingly
worked on a revised code, which unfortunately his subjects received with dismay
because it was a "masterpiece of obscurity."'" Indeed, the legal experts who
studied it declared that there was not a single sentence in it that could be
understood either by an ordinary citizen or by a trained lawyer. Soon, a picket
sign appeared before the royal palace declaring, "'How can anybody follow a
rule than nobody can understand?"""
King Rex quickly withdrew the code and recognizing for the first time that
he needed assistance, employed a staff of experts to work on a revision. The
190. Id. at 216-17.
191. Id. at 217.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 217-18.
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resulting code was a model of clarity. After it had been studied, it became
apparent that its new clarity merely brought light on its many contradictions. A
picket again appeared before the royal residence, declaring '"This time the king
made himself clear-in both directions."' 9
King Rex once again withdrew his revision, but having lost his patience with
his subjects, he instructed his experts to purge the code of contradictions and at
the same time drastically to stiffen every requirement contained in it and to add
a long list of new crimes. A revolution almost resulted when the new code was
published. Leading citizens declared their intention to flout its provisions, and
someone quoted the following passage: "'To command what cannot be done is
not to make law; it is to unmake law, for a command that cannot be obeyed
serves no end but confusion, fear, and chaos."""
Again, King Rex withdrew the new code and instructed his staff of experts
that whenever they encountered a rule requiring an impossibility, it should be
revised to make compliance possible. To accomplish this result, every provision
in the code had to be substantially rewritten. The final result, however, was
clear, consistent with itself, and demanded nothing of the subject that did not lie
easily within his powers. Nevertheless, before the effective date for the new
code had arrived, it was discovered that so much time had been spent in
successive revisions of the King's original draft that the substance of the code
had been overtaken by events. Accordingly, as soon as the new code became
legally effective, it was subjected to a daily stream of amendments. Again,
popular discontent mounted, and an anonymous pamphlet appeared on the streets,
carrying scurrilous cartoons of the king and a leading article with the title: "'A
law that changes every day is worse than no law at all."" '97
Although this source of discontent began to cure itself as the pace of
amendment gradually slackened, King Rex announced that because much of his
trouble lay in the bad advice he had received from experts, he was reassuming
the judicial power in his own person. In this way he could directly control the
application of the new code and insure his country against another crisis.
Accordingly, the King began to spend almost all of his time hearing and deciding
cases arising under the new code. For his subjects, "a new day seemed to dawn
when they could finally conform their conduct to a coherent body of rules." 9
This hope, however, was soon shattered as the King's subjects discovered that
there existed no discernible relation between those judgments and the code they
purported to apply. Insofar as it was expressed in the actual disposition of
controversies, the new code may not have existed at all, yet in almost all of his
decisions, the King declared and redeclared the code to be the basic law of his
kingdom. While leading citizens began to hold private meetings to discuss what
195. Id. at 218.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 218-19.
198. Id. at 219.
1130 [Vol. 55
1995] SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1131
measures, other than open revolt, could be taken to get the king away from the
bench and back on the throne, King Rex suddenly died, "old before his time and
deeply disillusioned with his subjects."'"
The first act of King Rex's successor, Rex II, was to announce that he was
taking the powers of government away from the lawyers and placing them in the
hands of psychiatrists and experts in public relations. This way, he explained,
"people could be made happy without rules."'
B. Fuller's Concept of "Procedural Morality"
Fuller uses King Rex's bungling career as a legislator and a judge to
illustrate that the attempt to create and to maintain a system of legal rules may
miscarry in at least eight ways, which he describes as follows:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so
that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes
are: (2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the
affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of
retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them
under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules
understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules; or (6) rules
that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7)
introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot
orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence
between the rules as announced and their actual administration. A total
failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a
bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a
legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a
void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract. Certainly
there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept
secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted, or
was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same
system, or commanded the impossible, or changed every minute. It
may not be impossible for a man to obey a rule that is disregarded by
those charged with its administration, but at some point obedience
becomes futile-as futile, in fact, as casting a vote that will never be
counted.... [T]here is a kind of reciprocity between government and
the citizen with respect to the observance of rules. Government says to
the citizen in effect, "These are the rules we expect you to follow. If
you follow them, you have our assurance that they are the rules that
199. Id.
200. Id.
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will be applied to your conduct." When this bond of reciprocity is
finally and completely ruptured by government, nothing is left on which
to ground the citizen's duty to observe the rules.2"'
Fuller notes that increasingly the principal object of government seems to be
not that of giving the citizen rules by which to shape his or her conduct, but to
frighten the citizen into impotence. In such a situation, the problem the citizen
faces is not as simple as that of a voter who knows with certainty that his or her
ballot will not be counted. Rather, Fuller argues, it is more like that of the voter
who knows that the odds are against his or her ballot being counted at all and
that, if it is counted, there is a good change that the ballot will be counted for
the side against which the citizen actually voted. Fuller concludes with the
following:
A citizen in this predicament has to decide for himself whether to stay
with the system and cast his ballot as a kind of symbolic act expressing
the hope of a better day....
In situations like these there can be no simple principle by which
to test the citizen's obligation of fidelity to law, any more than there
can be such a principle for testing his right to engage in a general
revolution. One thing is, however, clear. A mere respect for constitut-
ed authority must not be confused with fidelity to law. Rex's subjects,
for example, remained faithful to him as king throughout his long and
inept reign. They were not faithful to his law, for he never made
any.
20 2
201. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis supplied). Martin P. Golding has criticized Fuller's procedural
morality as follows:
What entitles Fuller to regard the eight conditions of success in the enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules as a morality? As conditions for the
successful performance of an activity (here law making), they seem to be no more a
morality than a batter's keeping his eyes on the ball is part of a morality of baseball.
Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-Major
Themes and Developments, 36 J. Legal Educ. 441, 478 (1986). See also Christie & Martin, supra
note 3, at 222 n.2.
202. Christie & Martin, supra note 3, at 220. Fuller's concept of the reciprocity between
government and citizen as an aspect of procedural morality also is reflected in John Finnis' Natural
Law and Natural Rights. In his discussion of punishment, Finnis observes the importance of
promulgation as follows:
The legal sanction, then, is to be a human response to human needs, not modelled on a
campaign of "social defence" against a plague of locusts, or sparrows. There is the need
of almost every member of society to be taught what the requirements of the law-he
common path for pursuing the common good--actually are; and taught not by sermons,
or pages of fine print, but by the public and (relatively!) vivid drama of the apprehension,
trial, and punishment of those who depart from that stipulated common way....
... The punitive sanction ought therefore to be adapted so that, within the framework
of its two sets of defining purposes already indicated, it may work to restore reasonable
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IX. KING REX AS REFLECTED IN THE CODE
As has been observed by The London Times reporters Jaime Dettmer and
Susan Ellicott, "[w]hat is clear through the minefield of definitions and
arguments over legal remedies is that sexual harassment at work is on the
increase in American and in European countries."20 3 Therefore, I believe that
it may fairly be said that a lasting solution to the problem of sexual harassment
will not quickly arise, despite the EU's considerable attention to the matter. The
Code's mission of quenching sexual harassment in the EU workplace is laudable,
and the EU must be commended in its efforts. Nevertheless, I believe that the
Code unwittingly travels on some of Fuller's eight distinct routes to disaster. In
particular, the Code fails to: (1) make available to the affected party the rules
he or she is to observe; (2) make rules understandable; (3) set forth rules that do
not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party because the rules
themselves are difficult to understand; and (4) establish a congruence between
the rules as announced and their actial administration. I believe that this failure
results not only in a bad system of law; it results, as Fuller notes, in a system
that cannot properly be called a legal system at all.2°4
Specifically, I believe that the Code fails to achieve a legal system for three,
perhaps, insurmountable reasons: (1) it requires an overwhelmingly active and
perhaps unachievable role for employers;2' (2) it utilizes a purely subjective
definition of sexual harassment;2 and (3) it does not account for the inherent
cultural differences between the Member States themselves and between the
Member States and the United States.2' 7 These three failings of the Code have
set its course on Fuller's "routes to disaster" in the following ways: (1) the
affected parties (employers and potential harassers) do not have available to
themselves the rules they are expected to observe; (2) the rules are difficult to
understand and lack specific and meaningful content; (3) because the rules are
difficult to understand in specific situations, they require conduct beyond the
powers of the affected parties; and (4) the resulting confusion most likely will
result in a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration.
personality in the offender, reforming him for the sake not only of others but of himself:
"to lead a good and useful life."
John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), reprinted in Christie & Martin, supra note
3, at 211-13 (emphasis supplied).
203. Jamie Dettmer & Susan Ellicott, Hearings Spark Debate on Meaning of Harassment, The
Times (London), Oct. 15, 1991.
204. See supra text accompanying note 201.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 210-220.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 221-234.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 235-258.
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I believe that these substantial obstacles strongly militate against the issuance
of a Regulation, a Directive, or a European Civil Code provision prohibiting
sexual harassment in the workplace in the EU and instead support the Commiss-
ion's choice of a Recommendation thereon, despite the Code's inherent problems.
Moreover, I believe that these obstacles support the adoption of a Recommenda-
tion because its non-binding nature characterizes it not as a "rule," standing on
its own and possessing great force, but rather as a "norm," representing general
policies having little force of their own and gathering content and force only by
virtue of their relationship to the specific rules that constitute EU law on sex
discrimination and sexual harassment. '0 The Recommendation's characteriza-
tion as a norm in turn protects it from Fuller's "procedural morality" con-
cers.
209
A. An Active Role for Employers
One notable but very troubling characteristic of the Code is that in order to
achieve its chief goal of improving corporate practice with regard to preventing
sexual harassment and sexual harassment claims, it envisions a very active and,
perhaps, inherently unachievable role for employers in preventing and remedying
sexual harassment in the workplace.1 In response thereto, EU companies
slowly are beginning to realize that sexual harassment at the workplace somehow
208. For the jurisprudential distinction between a "rule" and a "norm," see Roscoe Pound,
Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence 73-80 (5th ed. 1943).
209. The Code's lack of "procedural morality" is reminiscent of the uncertainty created by the
jurisprudence of anti-formalist reform, which was a reaction to the views that all law can be found
in statute and doctrine and that the judicial- function is to apply this law as found (the "formalist
approach"), and also was a challenge to use the social sciences or the reality of social life to guide
judicial decision where the formalist approach was inadequate to serve society. See Christie &
Martin, supra note 3, at 725, for an excellent discussion of reform jurisprudence.
210. In commenting upon this role and stressing that any action taken in the public sector will
serve as an example to the private sector, Ita Mangan, a barrister with the Commission, recommended
that employees emphasize to employers the loss in revenue to the employer caused by sexual
harassment, as people will work in a far less productive fashion when under psychological or physical
threat. Ms. Mangan further stated that implementing the EU Code would give practical advice to
employers, trade unions, and workers on the protection of the dignity of women and men at work
and that should sexual harassment occur, adequate procedures would be readily available to confront
the problem. See Audrey Magee, Harassment at Work Dominate Women's Seminar, Irish Times,
March 22, 1993, at 4.
Notably, Article 7 of the Code sets forth correlative employee responsibilities, providing that
employees themselves have a "clear role to play in helping to create a climate at work in which
sexual harassment is unacceptable ... through an awareness and sensitivity towards the issue and
by ensuring that standards of conduct for themselves and for colleagues do not cause offence."
Article 7 also emphasizes that .sexual harassment is not merely a "management problem" or a
"women's problem" but that all employees have rights and obligations with respect to the working
environment and thereby suggests that the victim exhibit through words or actions what they find to
be objectionable behaviour.
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must be addressed.2 1  Nevertheless, because almost all private companies
(approximately eighty percent in Britain as of 1991)12 have no policy whatso-
ever to address sexual harassment, meaningful guidance clearly has been needed.
Specifically, with regard to the role of the EU employer in preventing and
remedying sexual harassment, the Code states that the aim of the Code is:
to ensure that sexual harassment does not occur, and, if it does occur,
to ensure that adequate procedures are readily available to deal with the
problem and prevent its recurrence. The Code thus seeks to encourage
the development and implementation of policies and practices which
establish working environments free of sexual harassment and in which
women and men respect one another's human integrity.
21 1
The Code thus adopts a "twin-track" strategy, pursuant to which action is
necessary to protect employees against sexual harassment at work and to provide
measures to address the problem when it arises. Training and communication
strategies are required to minimize the risk of sexual harassment, whereas
211. Consider the following comments by Financial Times reporter Lucy Kellaway: "European
companies can no longer ignore the problem of sexual harassment. Governments, trade unions,
employers' bodies, industrial tribunals, the press, equal opportunities groups and countless victims
have made sure of that." Kellaway, supra note 124. "Everybody agrees that the taboo surrounding
sexual harassment must be broken and that it is up to companies to act." Kellaway, supra note 25.
Exemplifying the gradual "awakening" of companies to their new obligations, Britain increasingly
has been busy running a service advising employers on how to combat sexual harassment. In 1990,
an average of one employer per week used the service, whereas by 1992, the EOC had received about
two inquiries per day and the figures are increasing. See Kellaway, supra note 124. Similarly, legal
complaints and inquiries to Northern Ireland's EOC rose by more than one-quarter in 1992, with
complaints regarding sexual harassment showing a substantial increase. See Gerry Moriarty,
Complaints on NI Equality Up, Irish Times, Dec. 7, 1992, at 7.
212. Recent research by Britain's Industrial Relations Services, the pay and conditions research
group in the UK, found that although one-third of British employers had a policy to deal with sexual
harassment and a further third were considering introducing one, many British companies had policies
which do not satisfy the EU's guidelines, and more than one-fifth of UK employees did not know
if their organization had a sexual harassment policy. See Kellaway, supra note 124. Similarly, a
study by the Manchester, England, School of Management found that of 110 top British companies,
sixty-three percent did not have any specified procedures to deal with complaints about sexual
harassment. See Kemaghan, supra note 54. Moreover, in 1991 in Ireland, Ms. Rosaleen Glacken,
assistant general secretary of the Civil and Public Services Union, lamented that at the moment the
majority of those in management "do not have the competence to deal with complaints of sexual
harassment." See Magee, supra note 210. Nevertheless, according to a survey of 132 employers
conducted by Britain's Industrial Relations Service, there is a growing trend to introduce policies to
deal with sexual harassment, and more policies are being adopted by employers. See Ian Hunter,
Hope for the Sexually Harassed, The Independent, Nov. 28, 1993, at 18. Moreover, as of 1991, ICI
and the big clearing banks in the UK had been in the forefront among private sector employers, but
it is not clear whether their policies are having an effect. The public sector in the UK has taken a
stronger stand against sexual harassment, and its policies have tended to be broader than those in the
private sector. See Kellaway, supra note 25.
213. See Article 1.3 of the Code.
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effective complaints and counselling procedures are required to address an
incident of sexual harassment once it has occurred.
Moreover, Article 3.5 of the Code provides that employers have a
responsibility to seek to ensure that the work environment is "free" from sexual
harassment: "The prime objective should be to change behaviour and attitudes,
to seek to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment," through policies linked
to a broader policy to promote equal opportunities and to improve the position
of women and through procedures to deal with complaints. Thus, Article 3.5
emphasizes the need for a procedure to deal with complaints of sexual
harassment, but notes that a procedure is only one component of a larger strategy
to address the problem. In connection therewith, the Code suggests that training
and communication strategies are necessary to help men and women become
aware of the issue of sexual harassment and of the organization's policy to
address it. Article 5.A. of the Code of Practice therefore sets forth four elements
of a prevention strategy: policy statements, communicating the policy,
responsibility, and training. The Code also emphasizes that employees and union
representatives should be consulted in the development of policies and
procedures.
The Code's insistence upon an active role for the employer in combating
sexual harassment at the workplace is reminiscent of the American case Ellison
v. Brady,2t4 in which the court declared that "[e]mployers should impose
sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free from sexual harassment" and made
several references to the "discipline" of employees by employers." 5 This
active role is also similar to Ellison's predecessor, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson."'6
Professors Christie and Martin have raised the following insightful and
deeply troubling questions with regard to these cases:
Do Ellison and Meritor stand for the proposition that Congress has
given employers a police power and duty, together with quasi-judicial
authority, to regulate the conduct of employees? Are employers in
effect required to establish codes of sexual conduct and enforce them
with civil penalties? Could an employer dock a harassing employee's
pay or require the harassing party to pay a sum of money to the victim?
If the sexual harassment by one employee against another takes place
entirely off the employer's premises, is the employer nevertheless
required to take action after complaint? What investigative powers
should an employer have with respect to an employee's off-hours
conduct? On-site conduct? What due process rights (hearing, cross-
examination) does an employer have who is alleged to have harassed
another employee? Observe that the defendant in Ellison v. Brady is an
214. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
215. Id. at 882.
216. 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
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agency of the government, and administrative law already has spelled
out due process rights of agency employees; however, such standards
have heretofore been inapplicable to private employers. Have private
employers become in effect an arm of the state in promulgating and
enforcing codes of sexual conduct? One may note that the Federal
government has recently proposed guidelines that would extend an
employer's responsibility to preventing harassment of an employee by
a non-employee; it also has proposed guidelines that would require
policing of harassment not only on race and gender but also on religion,
national origin, age, or disability. See 58 FR 51266 (1993).217
Professors Christie's and Martin's incisive questions suggest other troubling
issues that the Code has not, and perhaps cannot, meaningfully answer, such as
whether serious criminal offences such as rape and indecent assault should be
covered by a policy prohibiting sexual harassment. Britain's Equal Opportunities
Commission ("EOC") believes that although there is not a definition in British
law of sexual harassment, this term includes rape. Accordingly, if rape is the
"ultimate sexual harassment" for which employers are obliged to introduce
procedures to protect employees, employers necessarily will encounter complex
issues regarding the manner in which they handle their internal proceedings. For
example, should the employer's disciplinary procedure be stayed until the
conclusion of criminal proceedings? What standards of proof and rules of
evidence should employers adopt if the police decide not to proceed? Does the
employer have the jurisdiction to deal with rape at all?"
Britain's EOC supports the view that it would be fair to put into an EU
employer's internal procedure that if there are criminal charges pending, the
employer will await the outcome of those charges before proceeding internally.
Nevertheless, whether or not a criminal investigation proceeds, an EU employer
may encounter a legal duty of fairness in public law in its proceedings, meaning
that the internal hearing may have to adhere to a higher standard of proof than
the civil standard of a "balance of probabilities." 2 9 That is, the legal duty of
217. Christie & Martin, supra note 3, at 1126 n.3.
218. See Deborah Wolfson, Sexual Harassment: A Field Day for the Lawyers, The Guardian,
Nov. 22, 1993, at E6. Perhaps, the questions raised by Professors Christie and Martin and by this
Article reflect a typically common-law perspective on social issues. That is, a typically civilian
perspective on social issues, as exemplified in the European Social Charter, for example, might be
that the state "delegates," as it were, to private employers, for example, the state's supervisory
powers, including some of the state's duties, legal process, guarantees, protections, etc. In contrast,
despite Ellison and Meritor, a typically common-law perspective might emphasize the private
employer's lack of a duty to enforce the law or to take an active role in positive social change.
219. See Wolfson, supra note 218. See also Klass v. Germany, 18 EHRR 305 (European Court
of Human Rights, 22 Sept. 1993); Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 16 EHRR 405 (European Court
of Human Rights, 24 June 1993); Kenneth James Best v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., [1993] EEC
342 (Irish Supreme Court, 3 June 1993); The Observer and the Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14
EHRR 153 (European Court of Human Rights, 26 Nov. 1991);'John Kyle v. P & J Stormonth
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fairness in public law is such that most employers are not equipped to guprantee
a fair procedure. If an employer faces judicial review of its internal procedures,
one of the issues raised will be that the standards of fairness taken as public
authority must be of the strictest standards. Therefore, this necessarily involves
adhering to a standard of proof that is close to the criminal burden of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" and adopting an internal procedure that is like the criminal
court and has the same evidentiary and procedural safeguards. The employer
also may need to adopt the principles that are developed in criminal courts for
sexual offences that govern, for example, the extent to which the prosecution can
ask about someone's sexual history.'
B. The Code's Subjective Definition of Sexual Harassment
Article 2.1 of the Code defines sexual harassment as "unwanted conduct of
a sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women
and men at work. This can- include unwelcome physical or non-verbal
conduct."'" Rather than confining itself to listing specific actions which
constitute sexual harassment, Article 2.2 of the Code states that a "range of
behaviour" may constitute sexual harassment. The test for determining whether
an action constitutes sexual harassment and, therefore, is unacceptable is if such
conduct is:
1. unwanted, unreasonable and offensive to the recipient;
2
2. a person's rejection of or submission to such conduct on the part of
employers or workers (including superiors or colleagues) is used
explicitly or implicitly as a basis for a decision which affects that
person's access to vocational training or to employment, continued
employment, promotion, salary or any other employment decisions;
and/or
Darling, WS, (1992] EEC 368 (Outer House of the Court of Session, Scotland, 10 July 1991).
220. See Wolfson, supra note 218. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 412, which prohibits the admission
into evidence of a rape victim's past sexual conduct but does not prohibit the admission into evidence
of a victim's speech and dress, with New Zealand's approach to combating sexual harassment through
the medium of employment contract law, which approach prohibits the sexual experience or
reputation of a sexual harassment complainant from being admitted into evidence. See 11 ILO, supra
note 16, at 61. For an article on the revision of the labour court system as it took place in New
Zealand, see Martin Vranken, Specialisation and Labour Courts: A Comparative Analysis, 9 Comp.
Lab. L. 497 (1988).
221. (Emphasis supplied). Although the Code's use of the term "harassment" suggests the need
for repeated incidents, the Code prohibits any act of harassment, even if it is done only once. For
example, physical violence or non-consensual touching of the victim's intimate body parts would
constitute sexual harassment the first time they occur. 11 ILO, supra note 16, at 24-25.
222. (Emphasis supplied). This subjective standard is reminiscent of the subjective in concreto
"reasonable man" standard utilized in the defense of duress in La. Civ. Code art. 1959 and Article
1112 of the French Civil Code, rather than the objective in abstracto "reasonable man" standard.
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3. such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile or humiliating working
environment for the recipient.
Article 2.3 of the Code thus sets forth a subjective definition of sexual
harassment in that "[t]he essential characteristic of sexual harassment is that it
is unwanted by the recipient, that it is for each individual to determine what
behaviour is acceptable to them and what they regard as offensive." Article 2.3
concludes that "[s]exual attention becomes sexual harassment if it is persisted in
once it has been made clear that it is regarded by the recipient as offensive,
although one incident of harassment may constitute sexual harassment if
sufficiently serious. It is the unwanted nature of the conduct which distinguishes
sexual harassment from friendly behaviour, which is welcome and mutual."
The Code's definition of sexual harassment is noteworthy in that it
incorporates two ideas. First, the definition focusses on how the recipient of the
behaviour regarded the behaviour rather than upon the motive or intent of the
harasser. Therefore, the Code establishes that such behaviour cannot be justified
by the fact that the harasser was joking or merely being friendly. Second, the
definition recognizes that sexual harassment includes but is not limited to sexual
conduct. The Code, therefore, establishes that sexual harassment may have
nothing to do with an attempt to initiate sexual relations but instead may be an
exhibition of power or even hostility.223
By focussing on the principle that the individual person himself or herself
may determine what is offensive and what is welcome or acceptable, the Code
suggests that the right to be treated with dignity is an individual right that is not
dependent upon the culture of the workplace and is not subject to the majority
view of colleagues. Therefore, according to the Code, as is the case with one's
life outside of work, one has the right to differentiate between the treatment one
will accept from one person and that which one will accept from another.
Pursuant to the Code, it is conceivable that one may accept one person's sexual
remarks, but not similar remarks by another person. That is, "[b]y welcoming
certain behaviour from one work colleague, a [person] does not confer a licence
upon all other colleagues to treat [him or] her in the same way." '24
In its meeting of 30 October 1991, the Economic and Social Committee of
the EU adopted an Opinion2 on the Commission's Recommendation on the
223. Rubenstein & De Vries, supra note 31, at 21. The Code's definition also distinguishes
between sexual blackmail or quid pro quo harassment, pursuant to which sexual harassment is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting the victim, and hostile environment sexual
harassment, pursuant to which the sexual harassment damages the employee's working environment.
Thus, the Code suggests that even where no tangible employment benefits are lost, women who work
in a sexually offensive working environment enjoy less favourable working conditions than their male
colleagues. Id. at 23. The Code's definition also emphasizes that sexual harassment is neither
"romantic nor sexy," although romantic relationships, which are consensual, often are formed in the
workplace. Id.
224. Id. at 24-25.
225. 1992 O.J. (C 14) 4-5.
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issue of sexual harassment, in which the Committee "wholeheartedly endorsed"
the Recommendation's emphasis on the "unwanted nature of the conduct," in
contrast to "friendly behaviour which is welcome and mutual." The Committee
requested, however, that along with this definition the Commission should
append practical examples of behaviour which the Commission considers to be
covered by the definition. The Committee argued that this appendix would help
Member States interpret the Code of Practice, would make management and
workers more aware of what actually constitutes offensive conduct or sexual
harassment at the workplace, and would be helpful to the prevention of sexual
harassment and the implementation of a basic training policy in this area and for
drafting appropriate clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
The Economic and Social Committee's Opinion 6 is indicative of the fact
that the Code's subjective definition of sexual harassment is inherently
problematic in that it focusses solely on the victim's perspective and thus
removes any impact whatsoever of societal views or cultural views about what
may or may not constitute offensive behaviour.227 The definition thus is
neither "real" nor "conventional" in the jurisprudential sense"8 in that it neither
communicates to others conventionally understood meanings nor states real or
essential attributes of what constitutes sexual harassment, particularly in the
"grey areas,"" other than the fact that the offensive behaviour is "unwanted"
or "unwelcome." This lack of content makes it exceptionally difficult for a
potential harasser to know whether or nor his or her behaviour, particularly in the
"grey areas," constitutes sexual harassment. As has been observed by The Daily
Telegraph reporter Lesley Garner:
Does simply making blue jokes or raising the subject of sex with...
colleagues qualify as sexual harassment? ... [T]here are no clear
answers to any of these questions. There is the infinite range of normal
human behaviour which between men and women involves the many
subtleties of sexual interest and pursuit. And there is the law. With the
rise of sexual harassment as a prosecutable offence, the two have
become entangled.... There is widespread misunderstanding of the
differences between pleasantries, flirting, even open sexual advances,
and this new offence called sexual harassment .... There is a lot of
room here for interpretation. You might find it offensive and thieaten-
ing to be groped, flashed at or shown dirty pictures. I might be the
226. See supra note 225.
227. One question that arises is whether under the Code an employee must prove that he or she
suffered severe psychological injury, merely than being offended, to win a sexual harassment suit.
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court
ruled that severe psychological injury neither should be required as proof of unreasonable interference
with an individual's work performance nor should it be required to establish an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment.
228. Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence--Men and Ideas of the Law § 2.00 (1953).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 232-234.
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object of exactly the same behaviour but enjoy it. If I do, it no longer
constitutes sexual harassment. I can see how this would baffle
[people]. 230
This comment well illustrates that one major problem with the "unwanted"
or "unwelcome" requirement in the Code's definition of sexual harassment is the
practical difficulty of determining whether the conduct, indeed, was wanted or
unwanted or welcome or unwelcome. For example, a victim might silently
accept harassment because she fears retaliation, yet under the Code, such conduct
would not appear to be unwelcome. Conversely, a victim might appear to find
the harassment to be unwelcome, yet, in fact, find it to be welcome.23'
The Code's subjective definition of sexual harassment also raises the
complex issue of whether the Code espouses a "reasonable person" or a
"reasonable woman" standard of "unwelcomeness," or whether the subjective
definition of sexual harassment might characterize some behaviour as being
sexual harassment that for another victim might not constitute sexual harass-
ment.232  Similarly, the Code's subjective definition of sexual harassment is
that it does not answer the questions of exactly what types of behaviour are
offensive? What types of offensive behaviour cause harm? Should people be
required to tolerate a minimum level of offensive sexual conduct within the
working environment? There is less agreement among men and women
regarding milder examples of sexual harassment than regarding the more extreme
examples, and thus confusion as to what exactly constitutes sexual harassment
230. See Lesley Garner, Where Do We Draw the Line? Sexual Harassment, Daily Telegraph,
Oct. 16, 1991, at 19.
231. One author has argued that with regard to American law on sexual harassment, statutory
definitions of "welcomeness" should determine whether there has been true consent or mere
acquiescence. See Juliano, supra note 11, at 1575. But given the inherent differences between
people's subjective feelings of something being "unwelcome," an attempt to codify a meaningful
definition appears to be unrealistic. Moreover, were a victim of sexual harassment to choose to
express his or her "unwelcome" response to the harassment in a manner not explicit, then such a
person might be deemed to have welcomed the offensive behaviour. The Code's subjective definition
of sexual harassment raises other evidentiary problems in that in deciding if conduct is unwelcome,
courts and juries are shouldered with the difficult burden of determining whether the victim "asked
for it." In connection therewith, the investigation may yield evidence that under United States law
would be excluded in federal cases. See supra text accompanying notes 214-220.
232. One American commentator has argued that to avoid the problems posed by both the
reasonable person and the reasonable woman standards, courts should adopt a "reasonable victim
standard with an explicit gender analysis as a relevant and necessary element of the case evaluation,"
thus focussing on the "power differential implicit in the relationship of the parties involved." See
Childers, supra note 89, at 902. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (court's
reliance on the "reasonable woman" standard with regard to sexual harassment, and acknowledgment
that this standard will change over time, suggests that the court adopted women's "positive
morality"); see Christie & Martin, supra note 3, at 1125 n. 1; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367 (1993) (court declined to use the language of a "reasonable woman" standard); Commonwealth
v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963 (Pa. 1991) (relying upon the "battered-woman syndrome'); Bender, supra
note 73.
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may permeate the workplace. For example, most men and women would agree
that a supervisor requiring an employee to perform sexual favours for the
supervisor if the employee wants to keep his or her job constitutes sexual
harassment; however, not all men and women would agree that unsolicited
comments and requests for dates constitute sexual harassment. As has been
observed by author Jolynn Childers:
Compliments, sexual innuendoes, sexual jokes, sexual references
scattered throughout conversations, and subtle pressure to comply with
implied sexual demands are all in the "gray" area for many people. In
contrast, pornography, extremely vulgar language, sexual touching and
battery, including rape, and other forms of sexual violence seem to be
more universally agreed-upon forms of harassment. 33
The "grey" area, however, may yield grievous, and potentially disastrous,
misunderstandings between men and women. In connection therewith, Ms.
Childers has commented as follows:
Because of the very different implications an uninvited sexual encounter
might have for a woman than for a man in th[e] larger societal context,
it is understandable that a woman and a man would perceive such
incidents differently. A woman who is trying to establish herself in
male-dominated or nontraditional career may not regard a seemingly
innocuous comment as a joke, because the content of the comment
undermines the professional image she is trying to project and maintain,
i.e., as an equal and a colleague in the working environment.234
C. Cultural Differences Within the Community
A final and, perhaps, insurmountable obstacle not addressed by the Code is
both the extremely diverse cultures between the Member States themselves and
the significant differences in the cultures of the EU and the United States.
Cultural differences between Member States in the EU are important because
these differences strongly militate against the adoption of an integrated statutory
prohibition on sexual harassment at the workplace.235 Moreover, cultural
differences between the United States and Europe may be a major impediment
to adopting a Regulation, Directive, or European Civil Code provision even
though the EU has adopted much of its sexual harassment guidelines from the
United States because unlike the EU, the United States as a federation is more
amenable to comprehensive federal sexual harassment law.
233. See Childers, supra note 89, at 866.
234. Id. at 869.
235. The cultural differences between the Member States suggest that many Member States will
choose whether and how to implement the Code in vastly different ways, thereby generating complex
conflict of laws problems.
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The significant differences between America and the EU with regard to
business ethics have prompted David Vogel, a professor at the Haas School of
Business, University of California at Berkeley, to observe:
The "ethics gap" between the United States and the rest of the
developed world remains substantial. By any available measure, the
level of public, business, and academic interest in issues of business
ethics in the United States far exceeds that in any other capitalist
country. Nor does this gap show any signs of diminishing; while interest
in the subject in Europe has increased in recent years, its visibility in
America has increased even more. 6
Vogel views "America's Protestant heritage" as a key element in the great
interest of Americans in business ethics:
By arguing that one can and should do "God's work" by creating
wealth, Protestantism raised the public's expectations of moral behavior
of business managers .... Compared to the citizens of other capitalist
nations, Americans are more likely to believe that business and morality
are, and should be, related to each other, that good ethics is good
business, and that business activity both can and should be consistent
with high personal moral values.u7
Noting that in Europe, in contrast, the moral status of capitalism traditionally
has been more questionable, Vogel comments that
[t]here appears to be much more cynicism about the ethics of business
in Europe and Japan. Europeans, in part due to the legacy of aristocrat-
ic and pre-capitalist values, have always tended to view the pursuit of
profit and wealth as somewhat morally dubious, making them less likely
to be surprised-let alone enraged-when companies and managers are
discovered to have been "greedy. ' ' 3s
236. See David R. Francis, US Interest in Ethics Greater than Rivals', Christian Science
Monitor, Jan. 15 1993, at 7. Notably, Professor Guy Horsmans disagrees with the analysis which
Vogel espouses, arguing instead that although Europeans and Americans both wish to make money,
Europeans are much less likely than are Americans to admit this goal. He observes, however, that
notwithstanding their profit motives, Europeans appear to be more concerned with social matters than
are Americans and that Europeans question the value of making money without simultaneously
addressing social problems. Professor Guy Horsmans, Lecture to European Economic Community
Seminar (March 24, 1994).
237. See Francis, supra note 236.
238. Id. Observe, however, that some civilians informally might disagree with Vogel's statement
because of the rather common civilian belief that Europeans, and perhaps the French in particular,
tend to be egalitarian when considering others, but personally will try to "beat the system." See infra
note 240 with regard to the "follies of socialism in western Europe."
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Noting also that Europeans often regard the American interest in business ethics
as somewhat excessive, Vogel, nevertheless, has observed a substantial increase
in business ethics in a number of European countries, such as the enactment in
several European countries of laws prohibiting sexual harassment. He concludes,
however, that fundamental national differences leave a gap "in the ways in which
business ethics is defined, debated, and judged." '239
Europeans may well be concerned at the unbridled litigation in the United
States and wonder if increased protection for victims of sexual harassment in the
European Union will foment more litigation. As has been observed by reporter
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in the Sunday Telegraph:
Unbridled litigation is eating away at the foundation of the United
States. Unless it is brought under control by legal reform, it will suck
the life out of the free-market system, subvert moral order, and poison
all the transactions of daily life .... The [United States] employer...
is potentially liable for permitting sexual harassment if one if his fork-
lift drivers, say, puts up a poster of a topless woman in the locker room,
or if a customer ogles one of his saleswomen. Regulations and
litigiousness are a deadly cocktail for the economy. The impediments
to enterprise in the United States have reached a point where they
match, and possibly exceed, the follies of socialism in western Europe.
In effect, America has adopted the rigidities of the EEC labour
markets-job tenure, high severance pay, etc-through the backdoor of
civil rights litigation.2
With regard to cultural norms, rather than business ethics, some have
claimed that the "European norm" is that "even grandmothers commonly go
topless at beaches (though not on city streets)";"" thus, it is not surprising that
the cultural gap between the United States and the EU continues to exist, at least
with regard to sexual harassment. For example, although twenty years ago
concerns about sexual equality in the EU were imported from America and
Europe's new debate about sexual harassment also had its origin in the United
States, many European men continue to think that America's concern with sexual
harassment in the workplace is "oddly American." '242 Indeed, Coro Mira, the
woman in charge of women's affairs in Spain's largest labour group, has stated
that "[c]ompliments about the way a woman looks are not generally considered
bad taste here. If a woman were offended by compliments, she'd have a hard
time claiming harassment."243 Not surprisingly, it is in southern Europe that
239. Id.
240. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Sunday Comment: Chipping Away the USA, Sunday Telegraph,
June 20, 1993, at 32.
241. See The Last Thing Women Need, The Gazette (Montreal), July 22, 1992, at B2.
242. See Riding, supra note 37.
243. Id.
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the "peccadillos of politicians" are not matters of state and rarely are subjects of
gossip and that sex scandals involving public figures in America result in
amusement and puzzlement among EU men and women.2 "
These cultural differences have prompted legislators in some Member States
to be reluctant to adopt what they view as being "the desexualization of the
United States." ' S For example, Veronique Neiertz, the French Secretary of
State for Women's Rights, has commented that France's new law prohibiting
sexual harassment carefully avoided "American excesses," such as casting all
sexual advances into potential criminal offences.2' In connection therewith,
New York Times reporter Alan Riding has observed:
Certainly in Mediterranean countries, where ordinary socializing
involves far more physical contact than in the United States and
northern Europe, there is a feeling that flirtation and sensuality are part
of the spice of life and should not be renounced.247
Research also reveals the significant cultural differences between the United
States and the EU with regard to sexual harassment. A recent joint study
conducted by the University of St. Thomas in Minneapolis/St. Paul and the
Industrial Society in London concludes that British women are more likely than
are American women to complain about sexual harassment. Nevertheless, sexual
harassment has received more attention in the United States than in Britain, and
many more sexual harassment cases are commenced in America than in the
United Kingdom.24 Similarly, a poll in the French magazine Le Point
suggests that French women are less sensitive than are American women to some
forms of sexual harassment. For example, in responding to questions regarding
hypotheticals, twenty percent of the women surveyed said that they would not
consider themselves to have been sexually harassed if they were asked to undress
during a job interview. Moreover, fourty-five percent of the women surveyed
thought that it would not be harassment for a male manager to suggest that a
female employee spend a weekend with him to discuss her request for a
promotion. Forty-seven percent of the women, however, considered this
hypothetical to constitute sexual harassment, while the balance of the women did
not respond. Forty-five percent of the men surveyed thought this conduct would
constitute sexual harassment, while fifty-one percent did not.249
Despite the apparent resilience of EU workers to conduct that Americans
might consider to be sexual harassment, letters to the editor of the International
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Mundiya, supra note 57, at 125.
249. See Riding, supra note 79.
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Herald Tribune suggest that Europeans actually "lag behind" Americans with
respect sexual harassment:
In the United States, sexual harassment is unacceptable. Europe lags
decades behind. In fact, sexual harassment is viewed as normal; most
women would rather suffer than speak out, for fear that they will not be
taken seriously or will lose their jobs. The question is not what men
think while they are sitting at their desks. The question is how they
interact with female colleagues. If problems do occur, all women,
whether executives or factory workers, need a legal, corporate, and
societal framework that takes their concerns seriously.2 0
Similarly, another commentator has speculated that "[t]he argument that
European women for years have been liberated without undue harassment does
not stand up. No American adults are very repressed by comparison to European
social views. '"251
Working women in the EU, however, seem to be losing their resilience to
what Americans might consider to be sexual harassment. In fact, the issue of
sexual harassment in the EU has become so popular that viewers' of Channel 4's
soap opera Brookside in England witnessed in the fall of 1993 a steady
escalation in one male character's subtle and then not-so-subtle sexual harass-
12ment. As has been observed in The Economist:
Sexual flirtation is second nature to the French, or so they like to
believe... [unlike]... in other countries such as America, Britain and
Germany .... But French men can be too keen on sex. Sexual
harassment of women workers by their bosses is believed to be
widespread. It has now been outlawed.
Similarly, New York Times reporter Alan Riding has commented:
For decades, the gap between French and American cultures could be
measured through sex-the French made saucy movies, kissed in public
and boasted of extramarital affairs, while Americans treated sex as
something between a secret ritual and an embarrassing necessity. That,
at least, was how many of the French saw things. ...
Now, however, it seems that not all is well behind France's facade
of sexual freedom. Some French men may think they are the natural
heirs to "le droit de cuissage"-the squire's.right to spend the wedding
night with the new brides of his estate-but more and more women
think otherwise. 54
250. See Letters to the Editor, Int'l Herald Trib., June 10, 1993.
251. See Brought to Bare, Vancouver Sun, July 27, 1992, at Al l.
252. See Hunter, supra note 212.
253. See Frenchmen, Beware, the Economist, July 6, 1991.
254. Riding, supra note 79.
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Likewise, Ms. Purificacion Gutierrez Lopez, the head of the Women's
Institute in Spain, has commented that the problem of sexual harassment has
always existed, "[b]ut the fact that it is now recognized and talked about means
we have started dealing with it. So far, though, Spanish women are only just
beginning to understand that sexual harassment is an offense."" 5 Similarly, it
appears that women in Italy are tired of "gratuitous" sexual comments. For
example, Ms. Francesca Tronco, an English teacher in Rome, has commented
that "[i]n this country, it's normal for men to say things to you, but that doesn't
justify it. It doesn't happen in other countries. Why should it happen
here?" '256 Not surprisingly, Italy's social attitudes toward sexual harassment in
the workplace have lagged "far behind" its good, but poorly enforced, laws.
257
Differences in culture thus are apparent in how Americans and Europeans
view sexual harassment, although New York Times reporter Alan Riding has
observed that the cultural gap may be lessening:
For all their sniggering at American hang-ups over sex, Europeans are
following the United States' example of clamping down on sexual
harassment in the workplace, drawing a line for the first time between
old-fashioned flirting and outright abuse. 58
The increasing awareness of sexual harassment in the EU may lead toward
a cultural shift that acknowledges the serious nature of harassment, but men and
women in the EU are only now learning about sexual harassment and thus some
progress must be made before a meaningful and workable consensus is reached
on the subject.
X. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment at the workplace in the EU is a pervasive and serious
problem adversely affecting men, women, and employers. In reaction thereto,
the EU has exhibited commendable courage in attempting to confront sexual
harassment through the November 1991 Recommendation on sexual harassment
and through the Code of Practice. Nevertheless, the EU's actions are problemat-
ic in that they lack a "procedural morality" that would make them meaningful
and workable to men, women, and employers. Accordingly, although the
Recommendation is not binding upon the Member States and exhibits difficulties
with regard to procedural morality and cultural differences, as a practical matter
the Recommendation, rather than a Regulation, a Directive, or a European Civil
Code provision, is the best solution to a problem that currently, and indeed
255. Riding, supra note 37.
256. Id.
257. See Doris Anderson, Former "Land of Mother" Surprisingly Shows Europe's Lowest
Birthrate, The Gazette (Montreal), Dec. 29, 1991, at D5.
258. See Riding, supra note 37.
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inherently, is not susceptible to uniform and integrated solutions. 9  In
summarizing the contending views on whether law originates in folkways or
whether it shapes society, Lon Fuller discussed a process that aptly describes this
difficulty:
We may picture Law and Society as the two blades of a pair of scissors.
If we watch only one blade we may conclude it does all the cutting.
Savigny kept his eye on the Society blade and came virtually to deny
the existence of the Law blade. With him even the most technical
lawyer's law was a kind of glorified folk-way. Austin kept his eye on
the Law blade and found little occasion in a book of over a thousand
pages to discuss the mere "positive morality" which social norms
represent. Blackstone shifted his eye from one blade to the other and
gave us the confused account in which, on the one hand, he bases the
common law on custom, and, on the other, informs us that the
authoritative statement of this custom is to be found only in court
decisions. As to add to the confusion, he then lays down rules for
determining when a Custom should be recognized by the law. We
avoid all these difficulties by the simple expedient of recognizing that
both blades cut, and that neither can cut without the other.2"
259. Indeed, one wonders whether law is even capable of ultimately overcoming the "original
sin" of rebellion against God and yielding to temptation, as exhibited in the Garden of Eden in which
Adam and Eve rebelled against God's only rule, namely, "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest
freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shall not eat of it: for in the day
that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." See Genesis 2:16-17 (King James). See also Romans
5:12-21 (King James).
260. Lan Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429, 452 (1934). See also Christie
& Martin, supra note 3, at 215 n.87.
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